holger meinhardt (15 Ergebnisse)

XXXIII, 242 p. Hardcover. Versand aus Deutschland / We dispatch from Germany via Air Mail. Einband bestoßen, daher Mängelexemplar gestempelt, sonst sehr guter Zustand. Imperfect copy due to slightly bumped cover, apart from this in very good condition. Stamped. Theory and decision library : Series C, Game theory, mathematical programming and operations research ; Vol. 45. Sprache: Englisch.

Zustand: New. In.

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Hardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 2014 edition. 150 pages. 9.25x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. reprint edition. 276 pages. 9.25x6.10x0.65 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This present book provides an alternative approach to study the pre-kernel solution of transferable utility games based on a generalized conjugation theory from convex analysis. Although the pre-kernel solution possesses an appealing axiomatic foundation that lets one consider this solution concept as a standard of fairness, the pre-kernel and its related solutions are regarded as obscure and too technically complex to be treated as a real alternative to the Shapley value. Comprehensible and efficient computability is widely regarded as a desirable feature to qualify a solution concept apart from its axiomatic foundation as a standard of fairness. We review and then improve an approach to compute the pre-kernel of a cooperative game by the indirect function. The indirect function is known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation of the characteristic function. Extending the approach with the indirect function, we are able to characterize the pre-kernel of the grand coalition simply by the solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations | Holger I. Meinhardt | Taschenbuch | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems | viii | Englisch | 2002 | Springer | EAN 9783540432951 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. The Pre-Kernel as a Tractable Solution for Cooperative Games | An Exercise in Algorithmic Game Theory | Holger Ingmar Meinhardt | Taschenbuch | Theory and Decision Library C | xxxiii | Englisch | 2016 | Springer | EAN 9783662513149 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Softcover. Zustand: Gut. Gebraucht - Gut Zustand: Gut, VIII, 205 pp. About this book: The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered. Written for researchers.

Zustand: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Seiten: 276 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | This present book provides an alternative approach to study the pre-kernel solution of transferable utility games based on a generalized conjugation theory from convex analysis. Although the pre-kernel solution possesses an appealing axiomatic foundation that lets one consider this solution concept as a standard of fairness, the pre-kernel and its related solutions are regarded as obscure and too technically complex to be treated as a real alternative to the Shapley value. Comprehensible and efficient computability is widely regarded as a desirable feature to qualify a solution concept apart from its axiomatic foundation as a standard of fairness. We review and then improve an approach to compute the pre-kernel of a cooperative game by the indirect function. The indirect function is known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation of the characteristic function. Extending the approach with the indirect function, we are able to characterize the pre-kernel of the grand coalition simply by the solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions.

Zustand: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Akademische Arbeit aus dem Jahr 2015 im Fachbereich Kunst - Architektur, Baugeschichte, Denkmalpflege, Note: 1,0, Akademie der Bildenden Künste Nürnberg, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Sep Rufs Pavillon-Ensemble für die Akademie der Bildenden Künste in Nürnberg gilt als Architekturikone der Nachkriegsmoderne. Der Bau, der bisweilen sogar auf eine Stufe mit Gropius' Bauhaus in Dessau gestellt wird, wurde im Jahr 2013 durch das Büro Hascher Jehle Architektur erweitert. Obwohl der Neubau für sich betrachtet im Großen und Ganzen annehmbar ist, hat man der Bestandsarchitektur keinen Gefallen getan. Eine folgenreiche Neukonzeption der Erschließung des Campus einerseits und der unfreiwillige Ausdruck maximaler Verschlossenheit der Baukörper zum umgebenden Landschaftsraum andererseits lassen die Erweiterung zu einer Karikatur des denkmalgeschützten Bestands geraten. Hier wurde nicht nur die Chance auf eine Entwicklung dieses architekturgeschichtlich bedeutungsvollen Ortes verpasst - man hat dem Ruf-Bau nachträglich einen Teil seiner Qualitäten genommen.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Die Erweiterung der Akademie der Bildenden Künste in Nürnberg (Sep Ruf, 1952/54) durch Hascher Jehle Architektur (2013) | Holger Meinhardt | Taschenbuch | 48 S. | Deutsch | 2020 | GRIN Verlag | EAN 9783346254764 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: GRIN Publishing GmbH, Waltherstr. 23, 80337 München, info[at]grin[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.