Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Charlotte y Peter Fiell son dos autoridades en historia, teoría y crítica del diseño y han escrito más de sesenta libros sobre la materia, muchos de los cuales se han convertido en éxitos de ventas. También han impartido conferencias y cursos como profesores invitados, han comisariado exposiciones y asesorado a fabricantes, museos, salas de subastas y grandes coleccionistas privados de todo el mundo. Los Fiell han escrito numerosos libros para TASCHEN, entre los que se incluyen 1000 Chairs, Diseño del siglo XX, El diseño industrial de la A a la Z, Scandinavian Design y Diseño del siglo XXI.

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In 1775, as hostilities between Britain and the colonies intensified, Paine wrote Common Sense to encourage the colonies to break the British exploitative hold and fight for independence.

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In 1775, as hostilities between Britain and the colonies intensified, Paine wrote Common Sense to encourage the colonies to break the British exploitative hold and fight for independence.

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Common Sense

Applewood Books

Introduction

As a long and violent abuse of power, is generally the Means ofcalling the right of it in question (and in Matters too which mightnever have been thought of, had not the Sufferers been aggravatedinto the inquiry) and as the King of England hath undertaken in hisown Right, to support the Parliament in what he calls Theirs, and asthe good people of this country are grievously oppressed by thecombination, they have an undoubted privilege to inquire into thepretensions of both, and equally to reject the usurpation of either.

In the following sheets, the author hath studiously avoided everything which is personal among ourselves. Compliments as well ascensure to individuals make no part thereof. The wise, and theworthy, need not the triumph of a pamphlet; and those whosesentiments are injudicious, or unfriendly, will cease of themselvesunless too much pains are bestowed upon their conversion.

The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind.Many circumstances hath, and will arise, which are not local, butuniversal, and through which the principles of all Lovers of Mankindare affected, and in the Event of which, their Affections areinterested. The laying a Country desolate with Fire and Sword,declaring War against the natural rights of all Mankind, andextirpating the Defenders thereof from the Face of the Earth, is theConcern of every Man to whom Nature hath given the Power of feeling;of which Class, regardless of Party Censure, is the

author.

P. S. The Publication of this new Edition hath been delayed, with aView of taking notice (had it been necessary) of any Attempt torefute the Doctrine of Independance: As no Answer hath yet appeared,it is now presumed that none will, the Time needful for getting sucha Performance ready for the Public being considerably past.

Who the Author of this Production is, is wholly unnecessary to thePublic, as the Object for Attention is the Doctrine itself, not theMan. Yet it may not be unnecessary to say, That he is unconnectedwith any Party, and under no sort of Influence public or private,but the influence of reason and principle.

Philadelphia, February 14, 1776

Of the origin and design of government in general. With conciseremarks on the English constitution.

Some writers have so confounded society with government, as to leavelittle or no distinction between them; whereas they are not onlydifferent, but have different origins. Society is produced by ourwants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes ourhappiness positively by uniting our affections, the latternegatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse,the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last apunisher.

Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in itsbest state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state anintolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to the samemiseries by a government, which we might expect in a country withoutgovernment, our calamity is heightened by reflecting that we furnishthe means by which we suffer. Government, like dress, is the badgeof lost innocence; the palaces of kings are built on the ruins ofthe bowers of paradise. For were the impulses of conscience clear,uniform, and irresistably obeyed, man would need no other lawgiver;but that not being the case, he finds it necessary to surrender up apart of his property to furnish means for the protection of therest; and this he is induced to do by the same prudence which inevery other case advises him out of two evils to choose the least.Wherefore, security being the true design and end of government, itunanswerably follows that whatever form thereof appears most likelyto ensure it to us, with the least expence and greatest benefit, ispreferable to all others.

In order to gain a clear and just idea of the design and end ofgovernment, let us suppose a small number of persons settled in somesequestered part of the earth, unconnected with the rest, they willthen represent the first peopling of any country, or of the world.In this state of natural liberty, society will be their firstthought. A thousand motives will excite them thereto, the strengthof one man is so unequal to his wants, and his mind so unfitted forperpetual solitude, that he is soon obliged to seek assistance andrelief of another, who in his turn requires the same. Four or fiveunited would be able to raise a tolerable dwelling in the midst of awilderness, but one man might labour out the common period of lifewithout accomplishing any thing; when he had felled his timber hecould not remove it, nor erect it after it was removed; hunger inthe mean time would urge him from his work, and every different wantcall him a different way. Disease, nay even misfortune would bedeath, for though neither might be mortal, yet either would disablehim from living, and reduce him to a state in which he might ratherbe said to perish than to die.

Thus necessity, like a gravitating power, would soon form our newlyarrived emigrants into society, the reciprocal blessings of which,would supersede, and render the obligations of law and governmentunnecessary while they remained perfectly just to each other; but asnothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it will unavoidablyhappen, that in proportion as they surmount the first difficultiesof emigration, which bound them together in a common cause, theywill begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each other; andthis remissness, will point out the necessity, of establishing someform of government to supply the defect of moral virtue.

Some convenient tree will afford them a State-House, under thebranches of which, the whole colony may assemble to deliberate onpublic matters. It is more than probable that their first laws willhave the title only of Regulations, and be enforced by no otherpenalty than public disesteem. In this first parliament every man,by natural right, will have a seat.

But as the colony increases, the public concerns will increaselikewise, and the distance at which the members may be separated,will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on everyoccasion as at first, when their number was small, their habitationsnear, and the public concerns few and trifling. This will point outthe convenience of their consenting to leave the legislative part tobe managed by a select number chosen from the whole body, who aresupposed to have the same concerns at stake which those have whoappointed them, and who will act in the same manner as the wholebody would act were they present. If the colony continue increasing,it will become necessary to augment the number of therepresentatives, and that the interest of every part of the colonymay be attended to, it will be found best to divide the whole intoconvenient parts, each part sending its proper number; and that theelected might never form to themselves an interest separate from theelectors, prudence will point out the propriety of having electionsoften; because as the elected might by that means return and mixagain with the general body of the electors in a few months, theirfidelity to the public will be secured by the prudent reflexion ofnot making a rod for themselves. And as this frequent interchangewill establish a common interest with every part of the community,they will mutually and naturally support each other, and on this(not on the unmeaning name of king) depends the strength ofgovernment, and the happiness of the governed.

Here then is the origin and rise of government; namely, a moderendered necessary by the inability of moral virtue to govern theworld; here too is the design and end of government, viz. freedomand security. And however our eyes may be dazzled with show, or ourears deceived by sound; however prejudice may warp our wills, orinterest darken our understanding, the simple voice of nature and ofreason will say, it is right.

I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle in nature,which no art can overturn, viz. that the more simple any thing is,the less liable it is to be disordered, and the easier repaired whendisordered; and with this maxim in view, I offer a few remarks onthe so much boasted constitution of England. That it was noble forthe dark and slavish times in which it was erected, is granted. Whenthe world was over-run with tyranny the least remove therefrom was aglorious rescue. But that it is imperfect, subject to convulsions,and incapable of producing what it seems to promise, is easilydemonstrated.

Absolute governments (tho' the disgrace of human nature) have thisadvantage with them, that they are simple; if the people suffer,they know the head from which their suffering springs, know likewisethe remedy, and are not bewildered by a variety of causes and cures.But the constitution of England is so exceedingly complex, that thenation may suffer for years together without being able to discoverin which part the fault lies, some will say in one and some inanother, and every political physician will advise a differentmedicine.

I know it is difficult to get over local or long standingprejudices, yet if we will suffer ourselves to examine the componentparts of the English constitution, we shall find them to be the baseremains of two ancient tyrannies, compounded with some newrepublican materials.

First.-The remains of monarchical tyranny in the person of the king.

Secondly.-The remains of aristocratical tyranny in the persons ofthe peers.

Thirdly.-The new republican materials, in the persons of thecommons, on whose virtue depends the freedom of England.

The two first, by being hereditary, are independent of the people;wherefore in a constitutional sense they contribute nothing towardsthe freedom of the state.

To say that the constitution of England is a union of three powersreciprocally checking each other, is farcical, either the words haveno meaning, or they are flat contradictions.

To say that the commons is a check upon the king, presupposes twothings.

First.-That the king is not to be trusted without being lookedafter, or in other words, that a thirst for absolute power is thenatural disease of monarchy.

Secondly.-That the commons, by being appointed for that purpose, areeither wiser or more worthy of confidence than the crown.

But as the same constitution which gives the commons a power tocheck the king by withholding the supplies, gives afterwards theking a power to check the commons, by empowering him to reject theirother bills; it again supposes that the king is wiser than thosewhom it has already supposed to be wiser than him. A mere absurdity!

There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition ofmonarchy; it first excludes a man from the means of information, yetempowers him to act in cases where the highest judgment is required.The state of a king shuts him from the world, yet the business of aking requires him to know it thoroughly; wherefore the differentparts, by unnaturally opposing and destroying each other, prove thewhole character to be absurd and useless.

Some writers have explained the English constitution thus; the king,say they, is one, the people another; the peers are an house inbehalf of the king; the commons in behalf of the people; but thishath all the distinctions of an house divided against itself; andthough the expressions be pleasantly arranged, yet when examinedthey appear idle and ambiguous; and it will always happen, that thenicest construction that words are capable of, when applied to thedescription of some thing which either cannot exist, or is tooincomprehensible to be within the compass of description, will bewords of sound only, and though they may amuse the ear, they cannotinform the mind, for this explanation includes a previous question,viz. How came the king by a power which the people are afraid totrust, and always obliged to check? Such a power could not be thegift of a wise people, neither can any power, which needs checking,be from God; yet the provision, which the constitution makes,supposes such a power to exist.

But the provision is unequal to the task; the means either cannot orwill not accomplish the end, and the whole affair is a felo de se;for as the greater weight will always carry up the less, and as allthe wheels of a machine are put in motion by one, it only remains toknow which power in the constitution has the most weight, for thatwill govern; and though the others, or a part of them, may clog, or,as the phrase is, check the rapidity of its motion, yet so long asthey cannot stop it, their endeavors will be ineffectual; the firstmoving power will at last have its way, and what it wants in speedis supplied by time.

That the crown is this overbearing part in the English constitutionneeds not be mentioned, and that it derives its whole consequencemerely from being the giver of places and pensions is self-evident,wherefore, though we have been wise enough to shut and lock a dooragainst absolute monarchy, we at the same time have been foolishenough to put the crown in possession of the key.

The prejudice of Englishmen, in favour of their own government byking, lords and commons, arises as much or more from national pridethan reason. Individuals are undoubtedly safer in England than insome other countries, but the will of the king is as much the law ofthe land in Britain as in France, with this difference, that insteadof proceeding directly from his mouth, it is handed to the peopleunder the more formidable shape of an act of parliament. For thefate of Charles the First, hath only made kings more subtle-notmore just.

Wherefore, laying aside all national pride and prejudice in favourof modes and forms, the plain truth is, that it is wholly owing tothe constitution of the people, and not to the constitution of thegovernment that the crown is not as oppressive in England as inTurkey.

An inquiry into the constitutional errors in the English form ofgovernment is at this time highly necessary; for as we are never ina proper condition of doing justice to others, while we continueunder the influence of some leading partiality, so neither are wecapable of doing it to ourselves while we remain fettered by anyobstinate prejudice. And as a man, who is attached to a prostitute,is unfitted to choose or judge of a wife, so any prepossession infavour of a rotten constitution of government will disable us fromdiscerning a good one.

Continues...

Excerpted from Common Senseby Thomas Paine Copyright © 2002 by Thomas Paine. Excerpted by permission.
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