Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Princeton University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 0691147124 ISBN 13: 9780691147123
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. It seems reasonable to believe that there might have existed things other than those that in fact exist, or have existed. This title develops a framework for clarifying this problem, and explores a number of actualist strategies for solving it. Series: Carl G. Hempel Lecture Series. Num Pages: 184 pages. BIC Classification: CFA; HPJ; HPL. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 148 x 223 x 20. Weight in Grams: 364. . 2012. 1st Edition. Hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Princeton University Press, United States, New Jersey, 2012
ISBN 10: 0691147124 ISBN 13: 9780691147123
Anbieter: WorldofBooks, Goring-By-Sea, WS, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 89,22
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In den WarenkorbPaperback. Zustand: Very Good. It seems reasonable to believe that there might have existed things other than those that in fact exist, or have existed. But how should we understand such claims? Standard semantic theories exploit the Leibnizian metaphor of a set of all possible worlds: a proposition might or must be true if it is true in some or all possible worlds. The actualist, who believes that nothing exists except what actually exists, prefers to talk of possible states of the world, or of ways that a world might be. But even the actualist still faces the problem of explaining what we are talking about when we talk about the domains of other possible worlds. In Mere Possibilities, Robert Stalnaker develops a framework for clarifying this problem, and explores a number of actualist strategies for solving it. Some philosophers have hypothesized a realm of individual essences that stand as proxies for all merely possible beings. Others have argued that we are committed to the necessary existence of everything that does or might exist. In contrast, Mere Possibilities shows how we can make sense of ordinary beliefs about what might and must exist without making counterintuitive metaphysical commitments. The book also sheds new light on the nature of metaphysical theorizing by exploring the interaction of semantic and metaphysical issues, the connections between different metaphysical issues, and the nature of ontological commitment. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Princeton University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 0691147124 ISBN 13: 9780691147123
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 104,07
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In den WarenkorbHardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 184 pages. 8.50x5.60x1.00 inches. In Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Princeton University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 0691147124 ISBN 13: 9780691147123
Anbieter: Mooney's bookstore, Den Helder, Niederlande
Zustand: Very good.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Princeton University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 0691147124 ISBN 13: 9780691147123
Anbieter: moluna, Greven, Deutschland
EUR 79,63
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In den WarenkorbZustand: New. It seems reasonable to believe that there might have existed things other than those that in fact exist, or have existed. This title develops a framework for clarifying this problem, and explores a number of actualist strategies for solving it.It seems .
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Princeton University Press Mai 2012, 2012
ISBN 10: 0691147124 ISBN 13: 9780691147123
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - It seems reasonable to believe that there might have existed things other than those that in fact exist, or have existed. But how should we understand such claims Standard semantic theories exploit the Leibnizian metaphor of a set of all possible worlds: a proposition might or must be true if it is true in some or all possible worlds. The actualist, who believes that nothing exists except what actually exists, prefers to talk of possible states of the world, or of ways that a world might be. But even the actualist still faces the problem of explaining what we are talking about when we talk about the domains of other possible worlds. In Mere Possibilities, Robert Stalnaker develops a framework for clarifying this problem, and explores a number of actualist strategies for solving it.