select committee study governmental operations (17 Ergebnisse)

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Zustand: Fair. Acceptable condition. (United States, CIA, Assassinations) A readable, intact copy that may have noticeable tears and wear to the spine. All pages of text are present, but they may include extensive notes and highlighting or be heavily stained. Includes reading copy only books.

Wraps. Presumed first edition/first printing. VOLUME 1 ONLY. iv, 245 pages. 24 cm. Title continues: "Storage of Toxic Agents, September 16, 17, and 18, 1975." From a United States Senate website: "In 1973, CIA Director James Schlesinger told Senate Armed Services Chairman John Stennis that he wished to brief him on a major upcoming operation. No, no my boy, responded Senator Stennis. Don t tell me. Just go ahead and do it, but I don t want to know. Similarly, when Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J.W. Fulbright was told of the CIA subversion of the Allende government in Chile, he responded, I don t approve of intervention in other people s elections, but it has been a long-continued practice. Late in 1974, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh revealed that the CIA was not only destabilizing foreign governments, but was also conducting illegal intelligence operations against thousands of American citizens. On January 27, 1975, an aroused Senate voted overwhelmingly to establish a special 11-member investigating body along the lines of the recently concluded Watergate Committee. Under the chairmanship of Idaho Senator Frank Church, with Texas Senator John Tower as vice-chairman, the select committee was given nine months and 150 staffers to complete its work. The so-called Church Committee ran into immediate resistance from the Ford administration, concerned about exposing American intelligence operations and suspicious of Church s budding presidential ambitions. The committee interviewed 800 individuals, and conducted 250 executive and 21 public hearings. At the first televised hearing, staged in the Senate Caucus Room, Chairman Church dramatically displayed a CIA poison dart gun to highlight the committee s discovery that the CIA directly violated a presidential order by maintaining stocks of shellfish toxin sufficient to kill thousands. Lacking focus and necessarily conducting much of its work behind closed doors, the panel soon lost any hope of becoming a second Watergate Committee. Critics, from Bing Crosby to Paul Harvey, accused it of treasonous activity. The December 1975 assassination of a CIA station chief in Greece intensified the public backlash against its mission. The panel issued its two-foot-thick final report in May 1976 without the support of influential Republican members John Tower and Barry Goldwater. Despite its shortcomings, the inquiry demonstrated the need for perpetual surveillance of the intelligence community and resulted in the creation of the permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Historian Henry Steele Commager assessed the Committee s legacy. Referring to executive branch officials who seemed to consider themselves above the law, he said, It is this indifference to constitutional restraints that is perhaps the most threatening of all the evidence that emerges from the findings of the Church Committee. " From Wikipedia: "The Church Committee was the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, a U.S. Senate committee chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-ID) in 1975. A precursor to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the committee investigated intelligence gathering for illegality by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) after certain activities had been revealed by the Watergate affair. By the early years of the 1970s, the unpopularity of the Vietnam War and the unfolding Watergate scandal brought the era of minimal oversight to an abrupt halt. The United States Congress was determined to rein in the Nixon administration and to ascertain the extent to which the nation's intelligence agencies had been involved in questionable, if not outright illegal, activities. A series of troubling revelations started to appear in the press concerning intelligence activities. First came the revelations of Christopher Pyle in January 1970 of the U.S. Army's spying on the civilian population an.

Wraps. Presumed first edition/first printing. v, 106 p. Footnotes. Chronology. 94th Congress, 2d Session, Senate, Report No. 94-755. THis is the final report of the so-called Church Committee, as this body was chaired by Senator Frank Church of Idaho. John Tower of Texas was the Vice Chairman. This committee investigated the performance of the intelligence agencies in conducting their investigation of the assassination and their relationships with the Warren Commission. Good. No dust jacket as issued. Cover has some wear and soiling.

Wraps. Zustand: Good. presumed First Edition, First printing. Senate document, 94th Congress, 2d Session, Report No. 94-755. viii, 651, [5] pages. Wraps. Figures. Footnotes. Appendices. Glossary. Small tears at spine, slight soiling to text, staples in front cover, small stains on title page. Inscribed to Nancy Brooks by Michael Madigan (Staff Counsel) and Spencer Davis (Staff Press Secretary). In 1973 the Senate Watergate Committee investigation revealed that the executive branch had directed national intelligence agencies to carry out constitutionally questionable domestic security operations. In 1974 Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh published a front-page New York Times article claiming that the CIA had been spying on anti-war activists for more than a decade, violating the agency's charter. Former CIA officials and some lawmakers, including Senators William Proxmire and Stuart Symington, called for a congressional inquiry. On January 21, 1975, Senator John Pastore introduced a resolution to establish a select committee to investigate federal intelligence operations and determine "the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government." The Senate approved the resolution, 82-4. The final report included 96 recommendations, legislative and regulatory, designed "to place intelligence activities within the constitutional scheme for controlling government power." The committee recommended strengthening oversight of intelligence activities. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield cautioned the Senate "against letting the affair become a âtelevision extravaganza.'" He and Republican Leader Hugh Scott carefully selected committee members, balancing experienced lawmakers with junior members and ensuring that members represented a variety of political viewpoints. Mansfield selected Democrat Frank Church of Idaho to serve as chairman. A 16-year member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Church recognized the strategic value of the nation's top intelligence agencies and was also mindful of the need for American institutions to function within the confines of U.S. constitutional law. He had aggressively lobbied to lead the investigation. Republican John Tower of Texas, a member of the Armed Services Committee, was selected as the committee's vice-chairman. The committee decided that most of its hearings would be held in closed, executive session, in order to protect intelligence sources and methods. The committee held a series of public hearings in September and October of 1975 to educate the American public about the "unlawful or improper conduct" of the intelligence community, highlighting a few carefully selected cases of misconduct. These hearings examined a CIA biological agents program, a White House domestic surveillance program, IRS intelligence activities, and the FBI's program to disrupt the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements. These nationally televised events offered the American public an opportunity to learn about the secret operations conducted for decades by U.S. intelligence agencies. The committee faced a formidable task: to conduct a wide-ranging investigation of the nation's most secret agencies and programs, and based on those findings, write a detailed report including legislative recommendations. All of this work was to be completed within one year (later extended to 16 months). After a meeting with President Gerald Ford and his top national security advisors, Church and Vice-Chairman Tower secured from the president a pledge that the White House would cooperate with Senate investigators. Staff identified potential programs for study and began requesting documents from intelligence agencies. Though staff did not always receive documents in a timely fashion, they enjoyed unprecedented access to materials that had never before been made public. Perhaps the most well-known of these internal reports, the CIA's so-called "Family Jewels," outlined the agency's misdeeds dating back to President Dwight Eisenhower's administration. This report, as well as those found in other agencies, provided road maps that staff investigators used to piece together complicated histories of domestic, foreign, and military intelligence programs during the Cold War era. Even with a peak staff of 150, however, organizing and analyzing these materials proved to be an arduous task. After holding 126 full committee meetings, 40 subcommittee hearings, interviewing some 800 witnesses in public and closed sessions, and combing through 110,000 documents, the committee published its final report on April 29, 1976. Congress approved legislation to provide for greater checks and balances of the intelligence community. In 1978 Congress approved and President Jimmy Carter signed into law the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), requiring the executive branch to request warrants for wiretapping and surveillance purposes from a newly formed FISA Court. Today, the Church Committee reports and hearings are frequently used by scholars who continue to examine U.S. intelligence activities during the Cold War era.

Wraps. Presumed first edition/first printing. VOLUME 6 ONLY. ix, [1], 1000, [6] pages. 24 cm. Title continues: "Investivations, November 18, 19, December 2, 3, 9, 10, and 11, 1975." From a United States Senate website: "In 1973, CIA Director James Schlesinger told Senate Armed Services Chairman John Stennis that he wished to brief him on a major upcoming operation. No, no my boy, responded Senator Stennis. Don t tell me. Just go ahead and do it, but I don t want to know. Similarly, when Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J.W. Fulbright was told of the CIA subversion of the Allende government in Chile, he responded, I don t approve of intervention in other people s elections, but it has been a long-continued practice. Late in 1974, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh revealed that the CIA was not only destabilizing foreign governments, but was also conducting illegal intelligence operations against thousands of American citizens. On January 27, 1975, an aroused Senate voted overwhelmingly to establish a special 11-member investigating body along the lines of the recently concluded Watergate Committee. Under the chairmanship of Idaho Senator Frank Church, with Texas Senator John Tower as vice-chairman, the select committee was given nine months and 150 staffers to complete its work. The so-called Church Committee ran into immediate resistance from the Ford administration, concerned about exposing American intelligence operations and suspicious of Church s budding presidential ambitions. The committee interviewed 800 individuals, and conducted 250 executive and 21 public hearings. At the first televised hearing, staged in the Senate Caucus Room, Chairman Church dramatically displayed a CIA poison dart gun to highlight the committee s discovery that the CIA directly violated a presidential order by maintaining stocks of shellfish toxin sufficient to kill thousands. Lacking focus and necessarily conducting much of its work behind closed doors, the panel soon lost any hope of becoming a second Watergate Committee. Critics, from Bing Crosby to Paul Harvey, accused it of treasonous activity. The December 1975 assassination of a CIA station chief in Greece intensified the public backlash against its mission. The panel issued its two-foot-thick final report in May 1976 without the support of influential Republican members John Tower and Barry Goldwater. Despite its shortcomings, the inquiry demonstrated the need for perpetual surveillance of the intelligence community and resulted in the creation of the permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Historian Henry Steele Commager assessed the Committee s legacy. Referring to executive branch officials who seemed to consider themselves above the law, he said, It is this indifference to constitutional restraints that is perhaps the most threatening of all the evidence that emerges from the findings of the Church Committee. " From Wikipedia: "The Church Committee was the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, a U.S. Senate committee chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-ID) in 1975. A precursor to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the committee investigated intelligence gathering for illegality by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) after certain activities had been revealed by the Watergate affair. By the early years of the 1970s, the unpopularity of the Vietnam War and the unfolding Watergate scandal brought the era of minimal oversight to an abrupt halt. The United States Congress was determined to rein in the Nixon administration and to ascertain the extent to which the nation's intelligence agencies had been involved in questionable, if not outright illegal, activities. A series of troubling revelations started to appear in the press concerning intelligence activities. First came the revelations of Christopher Pyle in January 1970 of the U.S. Army's spying on the.