Roberta wohlstetter (36 Ergebnisse)

Paperback. Zustand: Fair. No Jacket. Former library book; Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Paperback. Zustand: Good. For decades the controversy has raged: Was the Pearl Harbor disaster a result of criminal negligence by military officers in the Pacific theater? Was it, as some have claimed, a deliberate plot by the President in Washington? It seems unlikely that a country could have so many warnings pointing to the danger, and yet be so unprepared for the event itself. American intelligence could read top-secret Japanese codes and the U.S. was therefore in a posistion to transmit vital information to American commanders throughout the world. Most of the time Washington was able to predict both Japan's diplomatic moves and its military deployments. But, as this carefully documented book shows, the outlines of danger look sharp today because the disaster has occurred, and an entirely different image emerges upon reconstructing in detail the intelligence picture as it looked to the participants before the event. In 1941 the pieces of the puzzle were dispersed in a number of government agencies. Some were lost in the noise of signals pointing in other directions?toward a Japanese advance southward or into Siberia; some were slowed by the normal barriers of bureaucracy; and some were silenced by security requirements. At the center of the decision no one had completed the puzzle. Above all, this book reminds us sharply that detecting a surprise attack will be more difficult in the era of the H-bomb. As the Foreword states: "The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations?a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely.".…

Zustand: Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Soft cover. Zustand: Very Good. Softcovers; small creases at corners of wraps and several leaves; o/w in very good condition. Book.

Paperback. Zustand: New. For decades the controversy has raged: Was the Pearl Harbor disaster a result of criminal negligence by military officers in the Pacific theater? Was it, as some have claimed, a deliberate plot by the President in Washington? It seems unlikely that a country could have so many warnings pointing to the danger, and yet be so unprepared for the event itself. American intelligence could read top-secret Japanese codes and the U.S. was therefore in a posistion to transmit vital information to American commanders throughout the world. Most of the time Washington was able to predict both Japan's diplomatic moves and its military deployments. But, as this carefully documented book shows, the outlines of danger look sharp today because the disaster has occurred, and an entirely different image emerges upon reconstructing in detail the intelligence picture as it looked to the participants before the event. In 1941 the pieces of the puzzle were dispersed in a number of government agencies. Some were lost in the noise of signals pointing in other directions-toward a Japanese advance southward or into Siberia; some were slowed by the normal barriers of bureaucracy; and some were silenced by security requirements. At the center of the decision no one had completed the puzzle. Above all, this book reminds us sharply that detecting a surprise attack will be more difficult in the era of the H-bomb. As the Foreword states: "The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations-a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely.".…

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.

Zustand: New.

Paperback. Zustand: Good. First Edition; Later Printing. 426 pages; moderate foxing on the top exterior edge of textblock. Fading on spine. Minor rubbing on the covers. Minor creasing on back cover's top corner. Good condition otherwise. No other noteworthy defects. No markings.; - Your satisfaction is our priority. We offer free returns and respond promptly to all inquiries. Your item will be packaged with care and ship on the same or next business day. Buy with confidence.…

Zustand: Befriedigend. 1.Auflage. 431 S. Leinen. Buch mit etwas Tabakgeruch; Schutzumschlag leicht berieben und mit kleinen Randeinrissen; Schutzumschlag und Seiten etwas nachgebräunt, sonst gut. [K 227].

Zustand: new.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Zustand: New. For decades the controversy has raged: Was the Pearl Harbor disaster a result of criminal negligence by military officers in the Pacific theater? Was it, as some have claimed, a deliberate plot by the President in Washington? It seems unlikely that a country could have so many warnings pointing to the danger, and yet be so unprepared for the event itself. American intelligence could read top-secret Japanese codes and the U.S. was therefore in a posistion to transmit vital information to American commanders throughout the world. Most of the time Washington was able to predict both Japan's diplomatic moves and its military deployments. But, as this carefully documented book shows, the outlines of danger look sharp today because the disaster has occurred, and an entirely different image emerges upon reconstructing in detail the intelligence picture as it looked to the participants before the event. In 1941 the pieces of the puzzle were dispersed in a number of government agencies. Some were lost in the noise of signals pointing in other directions-toward a Japanese advance southward or into Siberia; some were slowed by the normal barriers of bureaucracy; and some were silenced by security requirements. At the center of the decision no one had completed the puzzle. Above all, this book reminds us sharply that detecting a surprise attack will be more difficult in the era of the H-bomb. As the Foreword states: "The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations-a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely.".…

Zustand: New. 1966. New edition. Paperback. . . . . .

Zustand: New. pp. 428.

Octavo softcover (VG); Photos available on request. All our specials have minimal description to keep listing them viable. They are at least reading copies, complete and in reasonable condition, but usually secondhand; frequently they are superior examples. Ordering more than one book may reduce your overall postage costs.…

Zustand: New. In English.

Zustand: New. 1966. New edition. Paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 1st edition. 428 pages. 8.75x5.75x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Zustand: Good. 426 pp. 8vo. Reprint. Wraps.

Zustand: Gut bis sehr Gut. Rotes Orig.-Leinen, 15x23, S 431.

Signale und Entscheidungen. Erlenbach, Eugen Rentsch Verlag 1966. 431 Seiten. Orig. Leinen, Schutzumschl., Gr.8°. Schutzumschl. m. Randläsur, sonst gut erhalten. SW: U.S.A., Japan, Pazifik, Zweiter Weltkrieg.

Erlenbach, Rentsch 1966. 431 Seiten. Orig. Leinen, Schutzumschl., 8°. Gut erhalten.

Paperback. Zustand: New. For decades the controversy has raged: Was the Pearl Harbor disaster a result of criminal negligence by military officers in the Pacific theater? Was it, as some have claimed, a deliberate plot by the President in Washington? It seems unlikely that a country could have so many warnings pointing to the danger, and yet be so unprepared for the event itself. American intelligence could read top-secret Japanese codes and the U.S. was therefore in a posistion to transmit vital information to American commanders throughout the world. Most of the time Washington was able to predict both Japan's diplomatic moves and its military deployments. But, as this carefully documented book shows, the outlines of danger look sharp today because the disaster has occurred, and an entirely different image emerges upon reconstructing in detail the intelligence picture as it looked to the participants before the event. In 1941 the pieces of the puzzle were dispersed in a number of government agencies. Some were lost in the noise of signals pointing in other directions-toward a Japanese advance southward or into Siberia; some were slowed by the normal barriers of bureaucracy; and some were silenced by security requirements. At the center of the decision no one had completed the puzzle. Above all, this book reminds us sharply that detecting a surprise attack will be more difficult in the era of the H-bomb. As the Foreword states: "The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations-a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely.".…

431 Seiten. Gebunden mit Schutzumschlag. Umschlag mit Randläsuren, sonst sehr guter Zustand. Sprache: Deutsch Gewicht in Gramm: 742.

Zustand: New. &Uumlber den AutorrnrnRoberta Wohlstetter was a historian of military intelligence who worked for the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit research organization, from 1948 to 1965 where she continued on as a consultant through 2002. She was awa.

Unbekannter Einband. Zustand: Gut. Eugen Rentsch Verlag 1962 : Roberta Wohlstetter - gb 431s. - Ohne SU DB-BL6Y-0MX0 Sprache: Deutsch Gewicht in Gramm: 500.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Pearl Harbor | Warning and Decision | Roberta Wohlstetter | Taschenbuch | Einband - flex.(Paperback) | Englisch | Stanford University Press | EAN 9780804705981 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Mare Nostrum Group B.V., Doelen 72, 4831 GR BREDA, NIEDERLANDE, gpsr[at]mare-nostrum[dot]co[dot]uk | Anbieter: preigu. …

HARDCOVER. Zustand: Very Good. Zustand des Schutzumschlags: Very Good. 1st Edition. Octavo hc w/jacket inn mylar, 426pp, tight binding, clean throughout, clean boards with sharp corners, light wear to the spine ends, owner's name & private library stamp, Very Good. Jacket is tight and complete with mild soiling to the back and spine, Very Good.…

Zustand: Good. Paperback, light tan, stains and rubs on cover, vend and fade on spine, stains on edge of book, in good condition, 426pp.

Trade paperback. Zustand: Good. Fourth Printing [stated]. 25 cm. xvi, [4], 426, [2] pages. Name in ink, obscured, on half-title page. Cover has some wear and soiling. Some edge soiling. Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling Note on Rank. Maps and Charts. Footnotes. Appendix, Abbreviations and Special Names. Bibliography. Index. Was the Pearl Harbor disaster a result of criminal negligence in the Pacific theater? It seems unlikely that a country could have so many warnings pointing to the danger, and yet be so unprepared for the event itself. American intelligence could read top-secret Japanese codes and the U.S. was therefore in a position to transmit vital information to American commanders throughout the world. As this carefully documented book shows, the outlines of danger look sharp today because the disaster has occurred, and an entirely different image emerges upon reconstructing in detail the intelligence picture as it looked to the participants before the event. In 1941 the pieces of the puzzle were dispersed in a number of government agencies. Some were lost in the noise of signals pointing in other directions, some were slowed by bureaucracy; and some were silenced by security requirements. No one had a complete picture. Roberta Mary Morgan, better known by her married name of Roberta Wohlstetter (August 22, 1912 - January 6, 2007), was one of America's most important historians of military intelligence. Her most influential work is Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Donald Rumsfeld, is said to have required that his aides read it. Wohlstetter worked for the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1965 and consulted with them through 2002. For decades the controversy has raged: Was the Pearl Harbor disaster a result of criminal negligence by military officers in the Pacific theater? Was it, as some have claimed, a deliberate plot by the President in Washington? It seems unlikely that a country could have so many warnings pointing to the danger, and yet be so unprepared for the event itself. American intelligence could read top-secret Japanese codes and the U.S. was therefore in a position to transmit vital information to American commanders throughout the world. Most of the time Washington was able to predict both Japan's diplomatic moves and its military deployments. But, as this carefully documented book shows, the outlines of danger look sharp today because the disaster has occurred, and an entirely different image emerges upon reconstructing in detail the intelligence picture as it looked to the participants before the event. In 1941 the pieces of the puzzle were dispersed in a number of government agencies. Some were lost in the noise of signals pointing in other directions toward a Japanese advance southward or into Siberia; some were slowed by the normal barriers of bureaucracy; and some were silenced by security requirements. At the center of the decision no one had completed the puzzle. Above all, this book reminds us sharply that detecting a surprise attack will be more difficult in the era of the H-bomb. As the Foreword states: "The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely.".…