p bieri (15 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: Neuf.

24 x 16 cm. Zustand: Gut. X, 411 Seiten ; Mit 28 Figuren Innen sauberer, guter Zustand. Hardcover, Pappeinband, mit den üblichen Bibliotheks-Markierungen, Stempeln und Einträgen, innen wie außen, siehe Bilder. (Evtl. auch Kleber- und/oder Etikettenreste, sowie -abdrücke durch abgelöste Bibliotheksschilder). Einband sehr gut erhalten. In Englischer Sprache B10-03-04D|S95 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 840.

Zustand: New. An elegant and subtle exploration of dignity and what it means to lose it. Nigel Warburton, author of A Little History of Philosophy Human Dignity shows a rich and insightful exploration of the idea of human dignity from various angles and at several level.

Softcover. 314 S. Ehem. Bibliotheksexemplar mit Signatur und Stempel. GUTER Zustand, ein paar Gebrauchsspuren. Ex-library with stamp and library-signature. GOOD condition, some traces of use. L08031 9027709637 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 580.

Frankfurt a.M., Fischer, 2003. 446 pp. Paperback. *good condition*.

Fischer, Frankfurt, 2006, 5.A, 445, TB, 8°, ohne Schutzumschlag, , Einband: leicht verknickt,

Broschiert. Zustand: Sehr gut. 1. Aufl. 311 S. + Index, 23cm x 15cm brosch. Eb., dieser mit minimalen Gebrauchsspuren, Eb. u. Buchschnitt leicht lichtrandig, Teil der Widmung auf Vordatz rausgeschnitten u. mit einem Extrablatt zugeklebt (kein Textverlust), ansonsten sehr guter Zustand. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 500.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. In.

Gebunden. Zustand: New.

Kartoniert / Broschiert. Zustand: New.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Transcendental Arguments and Science | Essays in Epistemology | P. Bieri (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | viii | Englisch | 1979 | Springer | EAN 9789027709646 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The goal of the present volume is to discuss the notion of a 'conceptual framework' or 'conceptual scheme', which has been dominating much work in the analysis and justification of knowledge in recent years. More specifi cally, this volume is designed to clarify the contrast between two competing approaches in the area of problems indicated by this notion: On the one hand, we have the conviction, underlying much present-day work in the philosophy of science, that the best we can hope for in the justifi cation of empirical knowledge is to reconstruct the conceptual means actually employed by science, and to develop suitable models for analyzing conceptual change involved in the progress of science. This view involves the assumption that we should stop taking foundational questions of epistemology seriously and discard once and for all the quest for uncontrovertible truth. The result ing program of justifying epistemic claims by subsequently describing patterns of inferentially connected concepts as they are at work in actual science is closely connected with the idea of naturalizing epistemology, with concep tual relativism, and with a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge. On the other hand, recent epistemology tends to claim that no subsequent reconstruction of actually employed conceptual frameworks is sufficient for providing epistemic justification for our beliefs about the world. This second claim tries to resist the naturalistic and pragmatic approach to epistemology and insists on taking the epistemological sceptic seriously.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The goal of the present volume is to discuss the notion of a 'conceptual framework' or 'conceptual scheme', which has been dominating much work in the analysis and justification of knowledge in recent years. More specifi cally, this volume is designed to clarify the contrast between two competing approaches in the area of problems indicated by this notion: On the one hand, we have the conviction, underlying much present-day work in the philosophy of science, that the best we can hope for in the justifi cation of empirical knowledge is to reconstruct the conceptual means actually employed by science, and to develop suitable models for analyzing conceptual change involved in the progress of science. This view involves the assumption that we should stop taking foundational questions of epistemology seriously and discard once and for all the quest for uncontrovertible truth. The result ing program of justifying epistemic claims by subsequently describing patterns of inferentially connected concepts as they are at work in actual science is closely connected with the idea of naturalizing epistemology, with concep tual relativism, and with a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge. On the other hand, recent epistemology tends to claim that no subsequent reconstruction of actually employed conceptual frameworks is sufficient for providing epistemic justification for our beliefs about the world. This second claim tries to resist the naturalistic and pragmatic approach to epistemology and insists on taking the epistemological sceptic seriously.

Dordrecht, Reidel, 1979. (VIII) 314 pp. Cloth + dustjacket. (SL, 133) *good condition* Contributors Günther Patzig, Richard Rorty, Mary Hesse, C.F. von Weizsäcker a.o.