Myerson roger (35 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: Very Good. Very Good condition. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp.

Zustand: Good. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Hardcover. Zustand: Fair. The item might be beaten up but readable. May contain markings or highlighting, as well as stains, bent corners, or any other major defect, but the text is not obscured in any way.

Hardback. Zustand: Good. Game theory deals with questions that are basic to all social sciences; it offers insight into any economic, political, or social situation that involves people with different goals or preferences. This book presents some of the most important models, solution concepts, and resutls of noncooperative and cooperative game theory, as well as the methodological principles that have guided the development of the fundamental models of game theory: games in extensive form and strategic form and Bayesian games with incomplete information. He defines Nash equilibria, sequential equilibria, and other equlibrium concepts and discusses their uses and limitations. He also covers incentive compatibility in games with communication, repeated games, two-person bargaining problems, cooperative solutions for coalitional games, and cooperation under uncertainty.…

Zustand: Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Zustand: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - A great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international restraints on a nation's use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.…

Zustand: New.

Zustand: New. pp. 600.

Zustand: New. This introductory text provides an examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of nonco-operative and co-operative game theory. It introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes advances in the field and presents an overview of decision theory. Num Pages: 600 pages, 42 line illustrations, 29 tables. BIC Classification: GPQ; PBUD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 235 x 157 x 39. Weight in Grams: 684. . 1997. 1st Paperback Edition. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.…

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 438 pages. 6.00x0.89x9.00 inches. In Stock.

hardcover. Zustand: Gut. 397 Seiten; 9780534423810.3 Gewicht in Gramm: 1.

Hard cover. Zustand: Very good. Includes CD. Duxbury Applied. Audience: General/trade.

Softcover. Zustand: Very Good+. Third printing, xiii,568p., bibliography, index, stiff printed wraps, VG+ Size: 8vo - over 7¾" - 9¾" tall. Book.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 438 pages. 6.00x0.89x9.00 inches. In Stock.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - A great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international restraints on a nation's use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.…

Zustand: NEW.

Wraps. Presumed first edition/first printing. vi, 25, [1] p. Illustrations. Endnotes. This is one of the Advancing Strategic Thought series. From Wikipedia: "This monograph is a short nontechnical introduction to the use of game theory in the study of international relations, focusing is on the problem of deterrence against potential adversaries and aggressors. The author uses game models to provide a simple context where we can see more clearly the essential logic of strategic deterrence. Dr. Roger B. Myerson, winner of the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics, is the Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. Dr. Myerson is the author of two books and many professional articles on game theory, information economics, and economic analysis of political institutions. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Dr. Myerson was elected Vice President of the Econometric Society in 2006. Dr. Myerson holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University. The above information may not be current. It was current at the time when the individual worked for SSI or was published by SSI. Very good. Cover has slight wear and soiling.…

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. reprint edition. 568 pages. 9.50x6.25x1.50 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.Game Theory will be useful for students at the graduate level in economics, political science, operations research, and applied mathematics. Everyone who uses game theory in research will find this book essential. …

Zustand: New. Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson s introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory.

Zustand: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. In good all round condition. No dust jacket. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,950grams, ISBN:9780674341159. …

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Game Theory - Analysis of Conflict (Paper) (OISC) | Analysis of Conflict | Roger B. Myerson | Taschenbuch | Einband - flex.(Paperback) | Englisch | 1997 | Harvard University Press | EAN 9780674341166 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.…

Zustand: New. Brand New. Soft Cover International Edition. Different ISBN and Cover Image. Priced lower than the standard editions which is usually intended to make them more affordable for students abroad. The core content of the book is generally the same as the standard edition. The country selling restrictions may be printed on the book but is no problem for the self-use. This Item maybe shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.…

Zustand: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.

Softcover. Zustand: gut. 1991. Game theory deals with questions that are basic to all social sciences; it offers insight into any economic, political, or social situation that involves people with different goals or preferences. This book presents some of the most important models, solution concepts, and resutls of noncooperative and cooperative game theory, as well as the methodological principles that have guided the development of the fundamental models of game theory: games in extensive form and strategic form and Bayesian games with incomplete information. He defines Nash equilibria, sequential equilibria, and other equlibrium concepts and discusses their uses and limitations. He also covers incentive compatibility in games with communication, repeated games, two-person bargaining problems, cooperative solutions for coalitional games, and cooperation under uncertainty. Part 1 Decision-theoretic foundations: game theory, rationality and intelligence; basic concepts of decision theory; axioms; the expected-utility maximization theorem; equivalent representations; Bayesian conditional-probability systems; limitations of the Bayesian model; domination; proofs of the domination theorems. Part 2 Basic models: games in extensive form; strategic form and the normal representation; equivalance of strategic-form games; reduced normal representations; elimination of dominated strategies; multiagent representations; common knowledge; Bayesian games; modelling games with incomplete information. Part 3 Equilibria of strategic-form games: domination and rationalizability; Nash equilibrium; computing Nash equilibria; significance of Nash equilibria; the focal-point effect; the decision-analytic approach to games; evolution, resistance and risk dominance; two-person zero-sum games; Bayesian equilibria; purification of randomized strategies in equilibria; auctions; proof of existence of equilibrium; infinite strategy sets. Part 4 Sequential equilibria of extensive-form games: mixed strategies and behavioural strategies; equilibria in behavioural strategies; sequential rationality at information states with positive probability; consistent beliefs and sequential rationality at all information states; computing sequential equilibria; subgame-perfect equilibria; games with perfect information; adding chance events with small probability; forward induction; voting and binary agendas; technical proofs. Part 5 Refinements of equilibrium in strategic form: perfect equilibria; existence of perfect and sequential equilibria; proper equilibria; persistent equilibria; stable sets of equilibria; general properties; conclusions. Part 6 Games with communication: contracts and correlated strategies; correlated equilibria; Bayesian games with communication; Bayesian collective-choice problems and Bayesian bargaining problems; trading problems with linear utility; general participation constraints for Bayesian games with contracts; sender-receiver games; acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria; communication in extensive-form and multistage games. Part 7 Repeated games: the repeated prisoner's dilemma; a general model of repeated games; stationary equilibria of repeated games with complete state information and discounting; repeated games with standard information - examples; general feasibility theorems for standard repeated games; finitely repeated games and the role of initial doubt; imperfect observability of moves; repeated games in large decentralized groups; repeated games with incomplete information; continuous time; evolutionary simulation of repeated games. (Part Contents) Game theory offers insight into any economic, political, or social situation that involves people with different goals or preferences. The author in this book presents some of the most important models, solution concepts and methodological principles that have guided the development of the field. Game Theory. Analysis of Conflict Myerson, Roger Spieltheorie Konfliktanlyse In englischer Sprache. pages.…

Zustand: New.

Hardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 2nd new edition. 544 pages. 9.25x7.00x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Hardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 438 pages. 6.00x0.94x9.00 inches. In Stock.