Misak ronald e (8 Ergebnisse)

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Zustand: New. In English.

HRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - In 1999 GEN Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, initiated the Army Transformation program attempting to both enhance the timeliness of employment for ground forces and to leverage technology to maintain our ground dominance. The first phase of the transformation consists of fielding initial brigade combat teams (IBCTs) at Fort Lewis, Washington. These IBCTs will develop the operational and organizational model for follow-on brigades using readily available equipment. The second phase consists of fielding an interim division (IDIV) using a yet-to-be-determined interim armored vehicle (IAV). The third phase consists of the total transformation to the Objective Force. The Objective Force requirement is to have a combat brigade on the ground within 96 hours after liftoff, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days. Sometime around the year 2003, the Army can expect to have a mixture of legacy forces such as the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and interim forces including the IBCT and IDIV. Each of these forces will have unique capabilities and employment requirements to maximize its use. The challenge for the Army will be to develop missions and orders that maximize the combat power of each type of unit. The monograph determines if current U.S. Army planning doctrine develops courses of action that fully utilize the capabilities of Army forces from legacy to interim forces to maximize combat power as outlined in FM 3-0, Operations. The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and a mechanized brigade from the division are used to represent legacy forces. The IBCT and proposed structure for the IDIV are evaluated to represent interim forces. Each force is analyzed to determine its numerical relative force ratio and its critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities developed using a model put forth by Dr. Joe Strange of the Marine Corps University. The Military Decision-Making Process from FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations is exami.…

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Field Manual 3-0, Operations, identifies that in 2001 military forces must control the tempo of full spectrum operations in war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). Adding to the complexity of operational control is the broad range of information that technology can deliver to the division commander. Technology allows the commander to expand his ability to view the battlefield and gather inputs from subordinate commanders and staff. The growing complexity makes it vital that the commander identify what information is important and clearly and concisely portray that information to his staff. With the increased importance of a clear and accurate vision, the G2, as head of the division intelligence effort, must ensure the commander is thoroughly grounded in the understanding of the opposition and of the environment in which the division will operate. Military intelligence doctrine provides for many different products and procedures to give the commander a baseline of information to develop his vision. The monograph will determine if current intelligence doctrine provides the commander with the necessary visualization of the battlefield to effectively conduct battle command as outlined in FM 3-0 (DRAG). The elements of operational design are introduced as part of visualization in the visualize, describe, and direct aspects of leadership. The elements of operational design are tools to aid in designing major operations and provide a linkage of ends, ways, and means. The monograph concludes that current intelligence doctrine does not provide the division commander the necessary visualization of the battlefield to effectively conduct battle command. The lack of clear identification of enemy centers of gravity prevents the commander from arraying the remaining elements of operational design to devise an effective operation to accomplish his endstate. Revisions of intelligence doctrine are necessary to fully support the commander and the provisions of FM 3-0.…

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - In 1999 GEN Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, initiated the Army Transformation program attempting to both enhance the timeliness of employment for ground forces and to leverage technology to maintain our ground dominance. The first phase of the transformation consists of fielding initial brigade combat teams (IBCTs) at Fort Lewis, Washington. These IBCTs will develop the operational and organizational model for follow-on brigades using readily available equipment. The second phase consists of fielding an interim division (IDIV) using a yet-to-be-determined interim armored vehicle (IAV). The third phase consists of the total transformation to the Objective Force. The Objective Force requirement is to have a combat brigade on the ground within 96 hours after liftoff, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days. Sometime around the year 2003, the Army can expect to have a mixture of legacy forces such as the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and interim forces including the IBCT and IDIV. Each of these forces will have unique capabilities and employment requirements to maximize its use. The challenge for the Army will be to develop missions and orders that maximize the combat power of each type of unit. The monograph determines if current U.S. Army planning doctrine develops courses of action that fully utilize the capabilities of Army forces from legacy to interim forces to maximize combat power as outlined in FM 3-0, Operations. The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and a mechanized brigade from the division are used to represent legacy forces. The IBCT and proposed structure for the IDIV are evaluated to represent interim forces. Each force is analyzed to determine its numerical relative force ratio and its critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities developed using a model put forth by Dr. Joe Strange of the Marine Corps University. The Military Decision-Making Process from FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations is exami.…