Maceachin douglas (12 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: Good. Good condition. A copy that has been read but remains intact. May contain markings such as bookplates, stamps, limited notes and highlighting, or a few light stains.

Zustand: Very Good. Very Good condition. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp.

paperback. Zustand: Good. Glossy paper covers; mild edge wear; 4to,9 3/4" to 12" tall; pencil underlining; 53 text pages followed by 62 documents. Additional shipping charges may need to be requested due to size or weight of book.

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. New edition. It's a well-cared-for item that has seen limited use. The item may show minor signs of wear. All the text is legible, with all pages included. It may have slight markings and/or highlighting.

Zustand: New. In English.

Soft cover. Zustand: Very Good. Oversized softcover. Blue and white paper covers clean and bright, with minor creasing at edges. Title page dated 1998. No copyright page. Unpaginated. Black and white photocopies of documents in the text. Clean throughout. Please email with questions or to request photos. Note: if there is a photo beside this listing, it's a STOCK photo that ABE put there (for reasons that we cannot understand or control) and might not match this actual book.…

Zustand: Very Good. Pages intact with possible writing/highlighting. Binding strong with minor wear. Dust jackets/supplements may not be included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Zustand: New. In English.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. new edition edition. 268 pages. 8.75x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Zustand: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. In good all round condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,500grams, ISBN:9780271025285.

Unknown binding. Zustand: Good. Likely ex-military library - likely lighter use with corresponding military stamp. Likely condition is Fair-Good if not stated. All other info as listed. NB note this is a placeholder description and my entire list is being regularly updated with photographs and information. Please enquire for further details for this copy.…

Trade paperback. Zustand: Very good. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Various paginations. References. Data Annex. Selected Archival Documents. Douglas J. MacEachin, the author of this monograph, was Deputy Director for Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency from March 1993 until June 1995. He joined the CIA in 1965 and, for the next 24 years, worked mainly on research and analysis of Soviet and European security affairs. He was Director of the Office of Soviet Analysis from 1984 until March 1989, when he became Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Arms Control. Mr. MacEachin holds baccalaureate and master's degrees in economics from Miami University of Ohio. During the period 1964-65, he was a full-time member of the faculty there. Before retiring from the CIA in 1997, Mr. MacEachin was a CIA Officer-in-Residence at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is now a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School. This work examines the role of signals intelligence in U.S. military planning during the final stages of the war with Japan in 1945 -- particularly its contribution to planning for an Allied invasion of the Japanese homeland. It is not intended as an argument for or against the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. Addresses the question of whether & to what extent intelligence might have influenced the decision to drop the bomb, & the military calculus concerning an invasion of Japan as it influenced the bomb decision. Examines the intelligence that was available at the time & to weigh the role this intelligence played in the deliberations on an invasion. This monograph was produced under the auspices of CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence and the Harvard University program for Studies of Intelligence and Policy. The idea was to examine the role of signals intelligence* in US military planning during the final stages of the war with Japan in 1945--particularly its contribution to planning for an Allied invasion of the Japanese homeland. This study was not intended as an argument for or against the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. Obviously, the importance of the bomb in concluding the war was of such magnitude that it is not plausible to examine intelligence related to invasion planning without addressing the question of whether and to what extent that same intelligence might have influenced the decision to drop the bomb. It also is not plausible to argue that the military calculus concerning an invasion of Japan does not bear directly on evaluations of the bomb decision. Nonetheless, the debates and historical studies supporting or condemning the use of the bomb involve factors that go well beyond the scope of this monograph. The study's basic objective is not to pass judgment on the decisions that were made, but rather to examine the intelligence that was available at the time and to weigh the role this intelligence played or might have played in the deliberations on an invasion.…