Leng mary (22 Ergebnisse)

Paperback. Zustand: New. Mary Leng offers a defense of mathematical fictionalism, according to which we have no reason to believe that there are any mathematical objects. Perhaps the most pressing challenge to mathematical fictionalism is the indispensability argument for the truth of our mathematical theories (and therefore for the existence of the mathematical objects posited by those theories). According to this argument, if we have reason to believe anything, we have reason to believe that the claims of our best empirical theories are (at least approximately) true. But since claims whose truth would require the existence of mathematical objects are indispensable in formulating our best empirical theories, it follows that we have good reason to believe in the mathematical objects posited by those mathematical theories used in empirical science, and therefore to believe that the mathematical theories utilized in empirical science are true. Previous responses to the indispensability argument have focussed on arguing that mathematical assumptions can be dispensed with in formulating our empirical theories. Leng, by contrast, offers an account of the role of mathematics in empirical science according to which the successful use of mathematics in formulating our empirical theories need not rely on the truth of the mathematics utilized.…

Zustand: New.

Zustand: New. In English.

Zustand: New. Mary Leng defends a philosophical account of the nature of mathematics which views it as a kind of fiction (albeit an extremely useful fiction). On this view, the claims of our ordinary mathematical theories are more closely analogous to utterances made in the context of storytelling than to utterances whose aim is to assert literal truths. Num Pages: 290 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: HPJ; HPK; PB; PBB. Category: (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 235 x 172 x 16. Weight in Grams: 422. . 2013. Paperback. . . . .…

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Zustand: New. Mary Leng defends a philosophical account of the nature of mathematics which views it as a kind of fiction (albeit an extremely useful fiction). On this view, the claims of our ordinary mathematical theories are more closely analogous to utterances made in the context of storytelling than to utterances whose aim is to assert literal truths. Num Pages: 290 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: HPJ; HPK; PB; PBB. Category: (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 235 x 172 x 16. Weight in Grams: 422. . 2013. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.…

Paperback. Zustand: New. Mary Leng offers a defense of mathematical fictionalism, according to which we have no reason to believe that there are any mathematical objects. Perhaps the most pressing challenge to mathematical fictionalism is the indispensability argument for the truth of our mathematical theories (and therefore for the existence of the mathematical objects posited by those theories). According to this argument, if we have reason to believe anything, we have reason to believe that the claims of our best empirical theories are (at least approximately) true. But since claims whose truth would require the existence of mathematical objects are indispensable in formulating our best empirical theories, it follows that we have good reason to believe in the mathematical objects posited by those mathematical theories used in empirical science, and therefore to believe that the mathematical theories utilized in empirical science are true. Previous responses to the indispensability argument have focussed on arguing that mathematical assumptions can be dispensed with in formulating our empirical theories. Leng, by contrast, offers an account of the role of mathematics in empirical science according to which the successful use of mathematics in formulating our empirical theories need not rely on the truth of the mathematics utilized.…

Zustand: New.

Zustand: New.

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Zustand: New. In English.

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Zustand: New. What is the nature of mathematical knowledge? Is it anything like scientific knowledge or is it sui generis? How do we acquire it? Should we believe what mathematicians themselves tell us about it? Are mathematical concepts innate or acquired? Eight new essays offer answers to these and many other questions. Editor(s): Leng, Mary; Paseau, Alexander; Potter, Michael D. Num Pages: 236 pages, Illustrations. BIC Classification: PBB. Category: (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 242 x 162 x 17. Weight in Grams: 477. . 2007. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . .…

Hardback. Zustand: New. What is the nature of mathematical knowledge? Is it anything like scientific knowledge or is it sui generis? How do we acquire it? Should we believe what mathematicians themselves tell us about it? Are mathematical concepts innate or acquired? Eight new essays offer answers to these and many other questions. Written by some of the world's leading philosophers of mathematics, psychologists, and mathematicians, Mathematical Knowledge gives a lively sense of the current state of debate in this fascinating field.…

Zustand: New. In English.

Zustand: New. Mary Leng defends a philosophical account of the nature of mathematics which views it as a kind of fiction (albeit an extremely useful fiction). On this view, the claims of our ordinary mathematical theories are more closely analogous to utterances made in the context of storytelling than to utterances whose aim is to assert literal truths. Num Pages: 290 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: HPJ; HPK; PB; PBB. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 241 x 163 x 21. Weight in Grams: 594. . 2010. hardcover. . . . .…

Hardcover. Zustand: Brand New. illustrated edition. 230 pages. 9.25x6.50x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Hardback. Zustand: New. Mary Leng offers a defense of mathematical fictionalism, according to which we have no reason to believe that there are any mathematical objects. Perhaps the most pressing challenge to mathematical fictionalism is the indispensability argument for the truth of our mathematical theories (and therefore for the existence of the mathematical objects posited by those theories). According to this argument, if we have reason to believe anything, we have reason to believe that the claims of our best empirical theories are (at least approximately) true. But since claims whose truth would require the existence of mathematical objects are indispensable in formulating our best empirical theories, it follows that we have good reason to believe in the mathematical objects posited by those mathematical theories used in empirical science, and therefore to believe that the mathematical theories utilized in empirical science are true. Previous responses to the indispensability argument have focussed on arguing that mathematical assumptions can be dispensed with in formulating our empirical theories. Leng, by contrast, offers an account of the role of mathematics in empirical science according to which the successful use of mathematics in formulating our empirical theories need not rely on the truth of the mathematics utilized.…

Zustand: New. What is the nature of mathematical knowledge? Is it anything like scientific knowledge or is it sui generis? How do we acquire it? Should we believe what mathematicians themselves tell us about it? Are mathematical concepts innate or acquired? Eight new essays offer answers to these and many other questions. Editor(s): Leng, Mary; Paseau, Alexander; Potter, Michael D. Num Pages: 236 pages, Illustrations. BIC Classification: PBB. Category: (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 242 x 162 x 17. Weight in Grams: 477. . 2007. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.…

Zustand: New. Mary Leng defends a philosophical account of the nature of mathematics which views it as a kind of fiction (albeit an extremely useful fiction). On this view, the claims of our ordinary mathematical theories are more closely analogous to utterances made in the context of storytelling than to utterances whose aim is to assert literal truths. Num Pages: 290 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: HPJ; HPK; PB; PBB. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 241 x 163 x 21. Weight in Grams: 594. . 2010. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.…

Hardback. Zustand: New. What is the nature of mathematical knowledge? Is it anything like scientific knowledge or is it sui generis? How do we acquire it? Should we believe what mathematicians themselves tell us about it? Are mathematical concepts innate or acquired? Eight new essays offer answers to these and many other questions. Written by some of the world's leading philosophers of mathematics, psychologists, and mathematicians, Mathematical Knowledge gives a lively sense of the current state of debate in this fascinating field.…

Hardback. Zustand: New. Mary Leng offers a defense of mathematical fictionalism, according to which we have no reason to believe that there are any mathematical objects. Perhaps the most pressing challenge to mathematical fictionalism is the indispensability argument for the truth of our mathematical theories (and therefore for the existence of the mathematical objects posited by those theories). According to this argument, if we have reason to believe anything, we have reason to believe that the claims of our best empirical theories are (at least approximately) true. But since claims whose truth would require the existence of mathematical objects are indispensable in formulating our best empirical theories, it follows that we have good reason to believe in the mathematical objects posited by those mathematical theories used in empirical science, and therefore to believe that the mathematical theories utilized in empirical science are true. Previous responses to the indispensability argument have focussed on arguing that mathematical assumptions can be dispensed with in formulating our empirical theories. Leng, by contrast, offers an account of the role of mathematics in empirical science according to which the successful use of mathematics in formulating our empirical theories need not rely on the truth of the mathematics utilized.…