fitch frederic (6 Ergebnisse)

Hardcover. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Ex-Library copy with typical library marks and stamps. Dust jacket missing. Second printing. Shelf and handling wear to cover and binding, with general signs of previous use. Boards betray fading and nicks and other signs of wear and imperfection commensurate with age. Binding is tight and structurally sound. Interior pages unmarked. Sealed in plastic for shipping. Secure packaging for safe delivery.

Hardcover. Zustand: Very Good. First Edition. First Edition, First Printing. Published by The Ronald Press, 1952. Octavo. Hardcover. Book is very good with shelf wear and previous owner name on pastedown. No dust jacket.100% positive feedback. 30 day money back guarantee. NEXT DAY SHIPPING! Excellent customer service. Please email with any questions. All books packed carefully and ship with free delivery confirmation/tracking. All books come with free bookmarks. Ships from Sag Harbor, New York.

Encuadernación de tapa blanda. Zustand: Muy bien. Idioma español. Ejemplar en muy buen estado. Dimensiones: 21x16 - 189 pp.

Hardcover. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Hardcover. Zustand: Near Fine. Zustand des Schutzumschlags: Near Fine. 1st Edition. X, 257 Pp. Red Brown Cloth, Gilt. First Printing. Book And Dj Are Near Fine, Light Rubbing At Corners, Immaculate.

[No place], The Association for Symbolic Logic, 1963. 8vo. In the original printed wrappers. In "Journal of Symbolic Logic", Vol. 28, Number 2. June, 1963. A very fine and clean copy. Pp. 135-142. [Entire issue: Pp. 113-175.]. First printing of Fitch's famous paper which laid the foundation for "The Fitch's Paradox of Knowability". "The literature on the knowability paradox emerges in response to a proof first published by Frederic Fitch in his now famous 1963 paper, "A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts." Theorem 5, as it was there called, threatens to collapse a number of modal and epistemic differences. Let ignorance be the failure to know some truth. Then Theorem 5 collapses a commitment to contingent ignorance into a commitment to necessary ignorance. For it shows that the existence of truths in fact unknown entails the existence of truths necessarily unknown. Fitch published the proof in 1963 to avert a kind of "conditional fallacy" that threatened his informed-desire analysis of value. The analysis roughly says: x is valuable to s just in case there is a truth p such that were s to known p then she would desire x. The existence of unknowable truths ultimately explains why he restricts the propositional variables to knowable propositions. For an unknowable truth provides for an impossible antecedent in Fitch's counterfactual, and ultimately trivializes the analysis. Since Fitch's theory of value is not the context in which the paradox is widely discussed, we will say no more about it here." (SEP).