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In den WarenkorbHardcover. Zustand: Very Good. Zustand des Schutzumschlags: Very Good. 1st Edition.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Stanford Univ Center for the Study, 2013
ISBN 10: 1575866641 ISBN 13: 9781575866642
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In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Center for the Study of Language and Information, 2013
ISBN 10: 1575866641 ISBN 13: 9781575866642
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Zustand: New. De se statements are emphatic assertions in which speakers make fundamental claims about either themselves or others. In English, they are usually conveyed via "I" statements or third person reflexive pronouns, such as "she herself," or "he himself." This volume teases out what de se attitudes connote linguistically. Editor(s): Feit, Neil; Capone, Alessandro. Series: Lecture Notes. Num Pages: 250 pages. BIC Classification: CF; HPJ; HPK. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 156 x 230 x 30. Weight in Grams: 582. . 2013. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
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In den WarenkorbHardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 256 pages. 8.32x5.80x0.91 inches. In Stock.
Zustand: Gut. Zustand: Gut | Seiten: 256 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | Bad Things addresses various philosophical questions about the nature and moral relevance of harm. The most basic question is this: under what conditions does an event (or do some events) harm a given individual? Neil Feit focuses primarily on the metaphysics of harm, and he both defends and extends the counterfactual comparative account of harm.
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In den WarenkorbHardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 256 pages. 8.32x5.80x0.91 inches. In Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Oxford University Press Mai 2023, 2023
ISBN 10: 0197660444 ISBN 13: 9780197660447
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Bad Things addresses various philosophical questions about the nature and moral relevance of harm. The most basic question is this: under what conditions does an event (or do some events) harm a given individual Neil Feit focuses primarily on the metaphysics of harm, and he both defends and extends the counterfactual comparative account of harm. On this account, in its most basic form, an act or event harms an individual provided that she would have been better off if it had not occurred. The counterfactual comparative account is widely accepted but also widely criticized. Feit provides detailed and thorough responses to the most challenging objections. He argues that an adequate theory of harm should entail the counterfactual comparative account but also make room for a certain kind plural harm, where two or more events together harm an individual although neither one by itself is harmful. These harmful events are bad things, collectively, even if no single event is itself a bad thing. Feit sets out and defends a detailed account of plural harm, addressing issues about the magnitude and the time of the harm suffered by the victim. The primary focus of the book is on the metaphysics of harm, but issues concerning its normative or moral relevance are addressed. In particular, Feit questions the received view that there are strong reasons, which can be overridden only in unusual circumstances, against harming per se.