Verlag: Washington : American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research , 1975, 1975
Anbieter: Wissenschaftliches Antiquariat Köln Dr. Sebastian Peters UG, Köln, Deutschland
Broschur. Zustand: gut. 76 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm, Lichtrand. Sprache: eng.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: RAND National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica, CA, 1993
ISBN 10: 0833014684 ISBN 13: 9780833014689
Anbieter: Ground Zero Books, Ltd., Silver Spring, MD, USA
Erstausgabe
Trade paperback. Zustand: Good. Presumed First Edition, First printing. xxviii, 102. Footnotes. Illustrations (Tables and Figures). Glossary. Bibliography. Cover has some wear, soiling, and edge tear (tear is also on title page). MR-346-USDP is printed on the back cover. This report examines the problem of rapidly accumulating weapons-usable fissile materials and proposes an agenda to help the United States and other countries manage these materials. Weapon-usable fissile materials come from dismantled nuclear weapons and the spent fuel from civilian nuclear power plants. This report is an important resource for nuclear nonproliferation planners and analysts and also to nuclear energy planners. This study was requests by the Office of the Deputy for Non-proliferation policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. There has been a concern that mismanagement of nuclear materials from weapon dismantlements might result in some of the materials being refashioned into nuclear weapons. This study found that countries, including the United States, have paid inadequate attention to an equally if not more serious potential danger on the civilian side. Another problem is the existence of commercial gas centrifuge and other sensitive enrichments technologies in nonnuclear weapon states. This study recommends that the United States initiate and encourage counters to undertake a four-element program for managing civilian nuclear development: reducing plutonium activities, use proliferation-resistant modes of nuclear power plant operations, focus research on advanced proliferation-resistant reactors, and negotiating an international arrangement that allows sensitive civilian nuclear materials and facilities to exist and operate only in the five currently declared nuclear weapon states.