This book explores the role of constitutions in public finance, with a special focus on transitional context in Central and Eastern Europe. The main questions addressed are : How do formal constitutional provisions that matter for public finance come about ? How do constitutions shape policy choices in public finance ? Part l of the book puts forth an analytical framework for analysing how fiscal constitutional provisions come about and tests the conjectures with the case of constitution-making in Estonia in 1991-1992. Part II summarises, synthesises and criticises the emerging orthodoxy in positive constitutional public finance and examines whether it can explain the commitment to fiscal discipline in Estonia between 1992 and 2007. Part III examines theoretically and empirically how constitutions can shape public finance laws via constitutional review, auto-limitation and constitutional deliberations.
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The Author: Ringa Raudla is a research fellow in the Department of Public Administration at Tallinn University of Technology (Estonia). She holds a doctoral degree in economics from the Faculty of Law, Economics, and Social Sciences, University of Erfurt (Germany). Her main research interests are political economy, public finance and post-communist transition.
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Anbieter: Fundus-Online GbR Borkert Schwarz Zerfaß, Berlin, Deutschland
Zustand: Sehr gut. 454 S. : Ill. Ein sehr gutes Exemplar. - PART I Constitutions as Explananda -- Constitutions as Explananda Hypotheses from the Existing Literature -- Introduction -- Hypotheses on Constitution-Making -- Modes of Constitution-Making -- The Actors Involved in Constitution-Making -- Members of the Constituent Body -- Constitutional Experts -- The General Public -- Constraints and Models -- Summary -- Testing Hypotheses on Constitution-Making The Case of Estonia -- Constitution-Making in Estonia in - -- Testing the Hypotheses -- Mode of Constitution-Making -- Actors Involved in Constitution-Making -- Members of Constituent Body -- Constitutional Experts -- The General Public -- Constraints -- Conclusions -- Fiscal Aspects of Constitutions as Explananda Theoretical Propositions and the Estonian Case -- Theoretical Propositions -- Actors Involved in Constitution-Making -- Constraints and Models -- Fiscal Provisions in Constitutions as Explananda -- A List of Conjectures -- Making of Constitutional Provisions Pertaining to Budgeting and Taxation in Estonia -- Making of Provisions Pertaining to Budgeting -- Making of Provisions Pertaining to Taxation -- Testing the Conjectures -- Discussion -- PART II Constitutions as Explanantia in Public Finance -- Why and How Do Constitutions Matter in Public Finance? -- Mechanisms of Influence Insights from Institutionalist Approaches -- Constitutional Rules and Political Setting -- Decisions and Actions of Actors in Political Setting -- The Calculus Approach' -- The Cultural Approach -- Why Are Constitutional Rules Followed? -- Do Constitutions Matter for Budgeting and Taxation? -- Analytical Framework for Constitutional Public Finance! -- Political Institutions as Explanantia in Public Finance -- Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism -- Theoretical Propositions -- Empirical Evidence -- Proportional versus Majoritarian Electoral Systems -- Theoretical Propositions -- Empirical Evidence -- Governing Arrangements Number of Individual and Partisan Decision-Makers in Legislature and Executive -- Theoretical Propositions -- Budgetary Commons Models -- Size of Legislature -- Size of Governing Majority -- Number of Parties in Legislature -- Number of Committees in Legislature -- Number of Parties in Governing Coalition -- Number of Spending Ministers in Cabinet -- Veto Players Models -- Coalition Parties as Veto Players in "Good Times" -- Coalition Parties as Veto Players in "Difficult Times" -- Fractionalisation of Partisan Veto Players -- Minority Governments -- Accountability in Different Governing Arrangements -- Empirical Evidence -- Size of Governing Majority -- Weak Government -- Number of Parties in the Coalition, Number of Spending Ministers -- Fractionalisation of Government and Legislature -- Duration of Governments -- Summary -- Bicameral versus Unicameral Legislatures // u.v.a. ISBN 9783631599457 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 675 Fadengehefteter Originalpappband. Artikel-Nr. 1026202
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Anbieter: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware -This book explores the role of constitutions in public finance, with a special focus on transitional context in Central and Eastern Europe. The main questions addressed are: How do formal constitutional provisions that matter for public finance come about How do constitutions shape policy choices in public finance Part l of the book puts forth an analytical framework for analysing how fiscal constitutional provisions come about and tests the conjectures with the case of constitution-making in Estonia in 1991-1992. Part II summarises, synthesises and criticises the emerging orthodoxy in positive constitutional public finance and examines whether it can explain the commitment to fiscal discipline in Estonia between 1992 and 2007. Part III examines theoretically and empirically how constitutions can shape public finance laws via constitutional review, auto-limitation and constitutional deliberations. 456 pp. Englisch. Artikel-Nr. 9783631599457
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book explores the role of constitutions in public finance, with a special focus on transitional context in Central and Eastern Europe. The main questions addressed are: How do formal constitutional provisions that matter for public finance come about How do constitutions shape policy choices in public finance Part l of the book puts forth an analytical framework for analysing how fiscal constitutional provisions come about and tests the conjectures with the case of constitution-making in Estonia in 1991-1992. Part II summarises, synthesises and criticises the emerging orthodoxy in positive constitutional public finance and examines whether it can explain the commitment to fiscal discipline in Estonia between 1992 and 2007. Part III examines theoretically and empirically how constitutions can shape public finance laws via constitutional review, auto-limitation and constitutional deliberations. Artikel-Nr. 9783631599457
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