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Wraps. Zustand: Very good. Zustand des Schutzumschlags: No dust jacket issued. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Format is approximately 6 inches by 9 inches. [2], 68, [4] pages. Footnotes. Tabular data. Livermore Papers on Global Security No. 10. Michael Albertson is deputy director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Prior to his current position at CGSR, he served for 16 years in the federal government handling a wide variety of deterrence and arms control-related portfolios for various organizations. From November 2018 to September 2020 he was a senior policy advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Office of Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, facilitating extended deterrence dialogues with NATO and Asian allies. Mr. Albertson worked as a team lead in the Department of State's Office of Strategic Stability and Deterrence Affairs from 2015 to 2018 on Russian strategic nuclear arms control issues including implementation and compliance of the INF Treaty and New START Treaties. He served from 2013 to 2014 on the National Security Council Staff covering Russian military-security issues; from 2010 to 2012 as a policy advisor to the senior advisor for Arms Control and Strategic Stability to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) participating in the negotiation, ratification, and implementation of the New START Treaty; and from 2004 to 2010 as an intelligence analyst and then senior intelligence analyst in the Department of Defense studying Russian military capabilities and doctrine. He holds a M.S. in strategic intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College, and an M.A. in security policy studies from George Washington University. From the Preface by Brad Roberts: On what new foundations might arms control of the future be built? Many arms control architects envision new structures assembled atop the existing foundations, on the argument that the foundations are durable and enduring. Thus, for example, they propose next steps on the bilateral U.S.-Russian strategic reductions pathway or a resurrection of regional restraints on nuclear and conventional forces in Europe. The problem with this way of thinking is that the legacy arms control approaches of the Cold War didn't wither away through indifference and neglect; rather, they lost their relevance as new problems and new political circumstances emerged. This important new Livermore Paper asks a simple question: in the new security environment, what are the new purposes the United States should want arms control to serve? It begins with the observation that "form follows function" and that a great deal more attention has been given to form than function. It continues with an exploration of the main factors that should determine function. These include a broad set of factors derived from the new security environment. The paper then goes on to elaborate metrics by which to assess different approaches. First and foremost, this is a conceptual analysis. It begins with first principles and derives implications. It is a helpful stimulus to the needed new thinking that is much sought but difficult to find.