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Patrons, Clients And Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition - Hardcover
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Political scientists have tended to assume that 'patron-client politics' is confined to developing countries. This volume examines how, despite a wave of democratization, patronage politics continues to exist in stable and wealthy polities and offers explanations of why politicians engage in clientelistic behaviours and why voters respond.
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Biografía del autor:
Herbert Kitschelt is George V. Allen Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at Duke University. He is the editor of Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (with Peter Lange, Gary Marks and John D. Stephens, 1999) and author of Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (with Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski and Gabor Toka, 1999), The Transformation of European Social Democracy (1994) and The Radical Right in Western Europe (1995) which won the Woodrow Wilson Award of the APSA in 1996.
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- VerlagNew Publisher
- Erscheinungsdatum2021
- ISBN 10 0521865050
- ISBN 13 9780521865050
- EinbandTapa dura
- Auflage1
- Anzahl der Seiten392
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Patrons, Clients, and Policies : Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition
Verlag:
Cambridge University Press
(2007)
ISBN 10: 0521865050
ISBN 13: 9780521865050
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Buchbeschreibung Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Most models of party competition assume that citizens vote for a platform rather than narrowly targeted material benefits. However, there are many countries where politicians win elections by giving money, jobs, and services in direct exchange for votes. This is not just true in the developing world, but also in economically developed countries - such as Japan and Austria - that clearly meet the definition of stable, modern democracies. This book offers explanations for why politicians engage in clientelistic behaviours and why voters respond. Using newly collected data on national and sub-national patterns of patronage and electoral competition, the contributors demonstrate why explanations based on economic modernization or electoral institutions cannot account for international variation in patron-client and programmatic competition. Instead, they show how the interaction of economic development, party competition, governance of the economy, and ethnic heterogeneity may work together to determine the choices of patrons, clients and policies. Artikel-Nr. 9780521865050
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