9780521865050 - patrons, clients, and policies: patterns of democratic accountability and political competition (3 Ergebnisse)
- Hardcover
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes KönigreichRia Christie Collections
Verkäufer/-in kontaktierenVerkäufer/-in mit 5 SternenZustand: Neu
EUR 139,13
EUR 13,91 VersandVersand von Vereinigtes Königreich nach USAAnzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Zustand: New. In.
- Hardcover
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USAKennys Bookstore
Verkäufer/-in kontaktierenVerkäufer/-in mit 5 SternenZustand: Neu
EUR 270,09
EUR 9,20 VersandVersand innerhalb von USAAnzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Zustand: New. A study of patronage politics and the persistence of clientelism across a range of countries. Editor(s): Kitschelt, Herbert; Wilkinson, Steven I. Num Pages: 392 pages, 34 tables. BIC Classification: JPL. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 242 x 176 x 31. Weight in Grams: 768. . 2007. Illustrated. h…ardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
- Hardcover
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, DeutschlandAHA-BUCH GmbH
Verkäufer/-in kontaktierenVerkäufer/-in mit 5 SternenZustand: Neu
EUR 204,37
EUR 63,93 VersandVersand von Deutschland nach USAAnzahl: 1 verfügbar
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Most models of party competition assume that citizens vote for a platform rather than narrowly targeted material benefits. However, there are many countries where politicians win elections by giving money, jobs, and services in direct exchange for votes. Th…is is not just true in the developing world, but also in economically developed countries - such as Japan and Austria - that clearly meet the definition of stable, modern democracies. This book offers explanations for why politicians engage in clientelistic behaviours and why voters respond. Using newly collected data on national and sub-national patterns of patronage and electoral competition, the contributors demonstrate why explanations based on economic modernization or electoral institutions cannot account for international variation in patron-client and programmatic competition. Instead, they show how the interaction of economic development, party competition, governance of the economy, and ethnic heterogeneity may work together to determine the choices of patrons, clients and policies.
