Revolt on the Tigris: The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq (Crises in World Politics) - Hardcover

"This important, detailed, evocative and revealing book is by a former Parachute Regiment officer who was awarded the CBE by the Foreign Office for his crucial and highly dangerous work in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion. . . . By not opposing the American decision to invade without proper plans for the reconstruction of Iraq, and then failing to insist upon sufficient troop levels for the far more difficult post-invasion phase, Blair risked hundreds of British lives. Etherington's work on the ground was obstructed and all but destroyed. The well-educated, moderate and potentially supportive Iraqi middle classes are paying the price but, as the ending of this excellent book argues, the dangerous work by brave people such as its author may yet succeed."--Hugh McManners, Sunday Times (London), 31 July 2005 "This is an extraordinary story, brilliantly told. . . . Etherington's courage, intelligence, empathy, intellectual rigour, scepticism and even idealism shine through. His understanding of the region, the reconstruction process and--crucially--the uses and limitations of military power, make him a superb guide through the complexities of occupied Iraq. Above all, one gets the sense that here is the right man in the right place at the right time, using decades of experience to make the best of a tricky brief, and somehow keeping his sense of humour amid the eating-soup-with-a-knife multinational reconstruction experience. . . . Etherington's equivocal success was a function of his energy, courage and integrity, but mostly Iraqi political will--an often inert force, sceptical of charlatans or adventurers, reluctant to be mobilised, often more evident through abstention than presence, but eventually ready, in small ways, to fashion political change. His account should be required reading for anyone who wants to understand the Iraq the headlines never cover."--Dominick Donald, The Guardian, 30 July 2005 "In October of 2003, fresh from a Cambridge degree in international relations, ex-paratrooper and conflict management expert Etherington--who served with the European Community Monitor Force in the former Yugoslavia--was charged by the Coalition Provisional Authority with the nearly impossible task of governing the Wasit province in southern Iraq. Etherington's literate, stoic and dryly humorous prose echoes his self-acknowledged 'English sense of reserve' and his low-key management style, and is in sharply ironic contrast to the chaos, mismanagement, and physical danger he finds in postinvasion Iraq. His climactic account of the uprising that occurred under the leadership of Moqtada al-Sadr is a tour-de-force of war reporting; at times a comedy of errors and, at others, a terrifying drama of suspense, it brings the surrealism of the twenty-first-century battlefield sharply to life. Though a qualified supporter of the war, Etherington provides a measured and intelligent critique of almost every aspect of the coalition's postwar planning. Particularly devastating are his detailed descriptions of the chronic lack of security caused by too few troops and the influence that corporations had on operational planning. But Etherington's annoyance is neither cynical nor defeatist, and his faith in the ultimate viability of a renewed Iraqi state--with intelligent planning and support--is convincing no matter which way one stands on the invasion. Anyone seriously interested either in the future of that beleaguered nation or the possibilities of intelligent diplomacy would do well to read this firsthand account."--Publishers Weekly (starred review) "Etherington is a hero of mine. I was a coalition deputy governor in two provinces neighboring his. We arrived and left on the same day; we were both besieged in our compounds by Sadr insurgents and we both handed over unstable provinces to our successors. He worked tirelessly and with real success and he writes with wit and powerful conviction. . . . Better plans, better people, more troops might, as Etherington argues, have given us a small advantage in 2003, but direct foreign rule was never going to turn Iraq into a liberal democracy."--Rory Stewart, The Daily Telegraph, 30 July 2005 "Revolt on the Tigris is the best account from the ground of the high intent of many of those sent forth by Paul Bremer, the American proconsul of the hour, to set things straight in post-Saddam Iraq, and where it went wrong"That is up to mid last year. In the dying weeks of 2005, things are still not going right, and there are a whole range of different issues."--Robert Fox, Times Literary Supplement, December 16, 2005 "Etherington's book is a rich depiction of the on-the-ground struggles he faced while trying to create the conditions for a lasting peace after major combat operations ceased. . . . He has provided a well-written and engaging narrative of his time in Iraq, describing the great responsibilities of the CPA and describing his bitter disappointment at its failure to provide the conditions necessary for a safe and secure future for the people of the Wasit province. His account paints a negative picture of all involved, including his bosses in Baghdad and London, the entire coalition, the local Iraqis, and finally, himself."--David Southworth, Jr., Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2008)

A former paratrooper in the British Army with extensive experience of conflict and post-conflict management in the countries of former Yugoslavia, Mark Etherington had just completed an M.Phil. in international relations at Cambridge University in 2003 when the British Foreign Office asked him to assume the governorship of Wasit Province in southern Iraq on behalf of the Coalition Provisional Authority or CPA.Etherington established a small team in the provincial capital of al-Kut on the banks of the Tigris in order to begin the process of reconstruction--both political and physical--of a province with a predominantly Shi'ia population of 900,000 and a long border with Iran.The province was plagued by poverty and beset by social paralysis. A demoralized and often corrupt police force was incapable of imposing the rule of law. Ba'ath party functionaries had been purged, local municipal authority was weak, and basic services were lacking. More challenging still was an escalating armed insurgency by the followers of Moqtada al-Sadr that would culminate in a sixteen-hour firefight for control over the CPA's base in Kut.This gritty and compelling firsthand account of post-conflict Iraq describes the turmoil visited on the country by outside intervention and the difficulties faced by the Coalition in fashioning a new political and civil apparatus.