values non atomic games von aumann robert (9 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: Good. Former library book; may include library markings. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages.

Hardcover. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Former library book; Missing dust jacket; Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 1.49.

Zustand: New. 342.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 333 pages. 10.00x7.00x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Hardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 348 pages. 10.00x7.00x1.02 inches. In Stock.

First edition of this "first class contribution to the field of game theory" (Oskar Morgenstern). Octavo, original cloth. Inscribed by Robert Aumann on the title page. Fine in a near fine dust jacket. The "Shapley value" of a finite multi- person game associates to each player the amount he should be willing to pay to participate. This book extends the value concept to certain classes of non-atomic games, which are infinite-person games in which no individual player has significance. It is primarily a book of mathematics--a study of non-additive set functions and associated linear operators.

First edition of this "first class contribution to the field of game theory" (Oskar Morgenstern). Octavo, original cloth. Association copy, inscribed by Aumann on the title page to fellow Nobel Prize-winning economist Kenneth Arrow, "For Ken Bob Aumann." Fine in a near fine price-clipped dust jacket. From the library of Kenneth Arrow. The "Shapley value" of a finite multi- person game associates to each player the amount he should be willing to pay to participate. This book extends the value concept to certain classes of non-atomic games, which are infinite-person games in which no individual player has significance. It is primarily a book of mathematics--a study of non-additive set functions and associated linear operators.

First edition, first printing. 8vo. xi, [1], 333, [3] pp. Original blue cloth, spine lettered and ruled in white, dust jacket (vertical crease along the title page, otherwise internally clean and unmarked; jacket price clipped with some light wear to extremities, notwithstanding an excellent copy). Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press.  'A most prolific collaboration between Aumann and Shapley, starting in the late 1960s and culminating in 1974 with the publication of their book Values of Non-Atomic Games', in which they 'engaged in the challenging problem of extending value theory to the case of a continuum of players'. One of the 'remarkable' discoveries of their research is the diagonal principle, 'stating that in games with many players one need consider only coalitions whose composition constitutes a good sample of the grand coalition of all participants' (New Palgrave).

First edition, first printing, of this influential contribution to game theory, which helped both authors to win the Nobel Prize. Here, infinite player scenarios - non-atomic games lacking discrete significant players - are combined with co-operative game theory, through the value solution developed by Lloyd S. Shapley (1923-2016). Octavo. Diagrams and formulae in the text. Original blue cloth, spine lettered in white. With dust jacket. Late 20th-century pencil ownership signature of Stanley C. Wisniewski, an American copyright judge, to front pastedown. Minor rubbing and bumping, slight scuff to rear endpapers; light rubbing, creasing, and sunning to clipped jacket, short closed tear to foot of rear panel: a very good copy in like jacket.