language truth logic von ayer alfred jules (55 Ergebnisse)

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Paperback. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Former library book; Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.43.

Paperback. Zustand: Fair. No Jacket. Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.43.

Paperback. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.43.

Paperback. Zustand: Fair. No Jacket. Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.43.

Paperback. Zustand: Fair. No Jacket. Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.43.

Paperback. Zustand: Fair. No Jacket. Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.43.

Paperback. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.43.

Paperback. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.43.

Paperback. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.43.

Soft cover. Zustand: Fine. 177p, a Fine pbk [0486200108].

Zustand: Good. (2nd)46 Edition. Ships from the UK. Former library book; may include library markings. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages.

Zustand: Good. (2nd)46 Edition. Former library book; may include library markings. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages.

Zustand: Good. (2nd)46 Edition. Former library book; may include library markings. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages.

Zustand: Good. (2nd)46 Edition. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages.

Zustand: New. KlappentextrnrnFirst published in 1936, this first full-length presentation in English of the Logical Positivism of Carnap, Neurath, and others has gone through many printings to become a classic of thought and communication. A first-rate antido.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - 'A delightful book . I should like to have written it myself.'--Bertrand Russell First published in 1936, this first full-length presentation in English of the Logical Positivism of Carnap, Neurath, and others has gone through many printings to become a classic of thought and communication. It not only surveys one of the most important areas of modern thought; it also shows the confusion that arises from imperfect understanding of the uses of language. A first-rate antidote for fuzzy thought and muddled writing, this remarkable book has helped philosophers, writers, speakers, teachers, students, and general readers alike. Mr. Ayers sets up specific tests by which you can easily evaluate statements of ideas. You will also learn how to distinguish ideas that cannot be verified by experience--those expressing religious, moral, or aesthetic experience, those expounding theological or metaphysical doctrine, and those dealing with a priori truth. The basic thesis of this work is that philosophy should not squander its energies upon the unknowable, but should perform its proper function in criticism and analysis.

Zustand: Good. Former library book; may include library markings. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages.

Soft cover. Zustand: Fine. No Jacket. Reprint. pp 160 plus 16 page publishers catalogue at the back. Pictorial glossy card covers. Almost As New.

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Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC is the classic work of philosophy by Alfred Jules Ayer published in 1936 when Ayer was 26 (though it was in fact completed by age 25). This book defines, explains, and argues for the verification principle of logical positivism, as it relates to the use of objectives and methods in determining truths and probabilities. And whether or not one agrees that emperical evidence is the only basis for proof, there is no denying that this is a brilliant book in how it explains in what ways the principle of verifiability may be applied to the problems of philosophy itself.

Zustand: Good. Paperback, illustrated with numerous equations and diagrams, 8vo.

paperback. Zustand: Very Good. 2nd.

Paperback. Zustand: Gut. 160 p. Fresh and clean copy with some markings in pencil and signs of wear on the front cover. Frisches und sauberes Exemplar mit einigen Bleistiftmarkierungen und Gebrauchsspuren auf dem Vorderdeckel. CONTENTS Introduction Preface Ch. I. The Elimination of Metaphysics p, 33' What is the purpose and method of philosophy? Rejection of the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a transcendent reality. 34: Kant also rejected metaphysics in this sense, but whereas he accused metaphysicians of ignoring the limits of the human understanding we accuse them of disobeying the rules which govern the significant use of language. 33: Adoption of verifiability as a criterion for testing the significance of putative statements of fact. 36: Distinction between conclusive and partial verification. No propositions can be conclusively verified. 38: Or conclusively confuted. 38: For a statement of fact to be genuine some possible observations must be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood. 39: Examples of the kinds of assertions, familiar to philosophers, which are ruled out by our criterion. 41: Metaphysical sentences defined as sentences which express neither tautologies nor empirical hypotheses. 42: Linguistic confusions the prime source of metaphysics. 44: Metaphysics and Poetry. Ch. II. The Function of Philosophy p. 46: Philosophy is not a search for first principles. 46: Barrenness of Descartes' procedure. 48: The function of philosophy is wholly critical. But this does not mean that it can give an a priori justification of our scientific or common-sense assumptions. 49: There is no genuine problem of induction, as ordinarily conceived. 31: Philosophising is an activity of analysis. 31: Most of those who are commonly thought to have been great philosophers were philosophers in our sense, rather than metaphysicians. 32: Locke, Berkeley, Hume as analysts. 53: We adopt Berkeley's phenomenalism without his theism. 34: And take a Humean view of causation. 56: Philosophy in our sense is wholly independent of metaphysics. We are not committed to any doctrine of atomism. 57; The philosopher as an analyst is not concerned with the physical properties of things, but only with the way in which we speak about them. 38: Linguistic propositions disguised in factual terminology. 39: Philosophy issues in definitions. Ch. III. The Nature of Philosophical Analysis p. 39: Philosophy provides not explicit definitions, such as are given in dictionaries, but definitions in use. Explanation of this distinction. 60: Russell's "theory of descriptions" as an example of philosophical analysis. 62: Definition of an ambiguous symbol. 63: Definition of a logical construction. 64: Material things are logical constructions out of sense-contents. 64: By defining the notion of a material thing in terms of sense-contents we solve the so-called problem of perception. 63: A solution of this problem outlined as a further example of philosophical analysis. 68: Utility of such analyses. 68: Danger of saying that philosophy is concerned with meaning. 70; The propositions of philosophy are not empirical propositions concerning the way in which people actually use words. They are concerned with the logical consequences of linguistic conventions. 71: Rejection of the view that "every language has a structure concerning which in the language nothing can be said." Ch. IV. The A Priori p. 71: As empiricists, we must deny that any general proposition concerning a matter of fact can be known certainly to be valid. 72: How then are we to deal with the propositions of formal logic and mathematics? 74: Rejection of Mill's view that these propositions are inductive generalisations. 77: They are necessarily true because they are analytic. 77: Kant's definitions of analytic and synthetic judgements. 78: Emendation of Kant's definitions. 79: Analytic propositions are tautological; they say nothing concerning any matter of fact. 80: But they give us new knowledge, inasmuch as they bring to light the implications of our linguistic usages. 81: Logic does not describe "the laws of thought." 82: Nor geometry the properties of physical space. 84: Our account of a priori truths undermines Kant's transcendental system. 83: How, if they are tautological, can there be in mathematics and logic the possibility of invention and discovery? Ch. V. Truth and Probability p. 87: What is truth? 88: Definition of a proposition. 88: The words "true" and "false" function in the sentence simply as assertion and negation signs. 90: The "problem of truth" reduced to the question, How are propositions validated? 90: The criterion of the validity of empirical propositions is not purely formal. 91: No empirical propositions are certain, not even those which refer to immediate experience. 94: Observation confirms or discredits not just a single hypothesis but a system of hypotheses. 93: The "facts of experience" can never compel us to abandon a hypothesis. 96: Danger of mistaking synthetic for analytic propositions. 97: Hypotheses as rules which govern our expectation of future experience. 100: Definition of rationality. 101: Definition of probability in terms of rationality. 101: Propositions referring to the past. Ch. VI. Critique of Ethics and Theology p. 102: How does an empiricist deal with assertions of value? 103: Distinction between various types of ethical enquiry. 104: Utilitarian and subjectivist theories of ethics consistent with empiricism. 103: But unacceptable on other grounds. 105: Distinction between normative and descriptive ethical symbols. 106: Rejection of intuitionism. 107: Assertions of value are not scientific but "emotive." 107: They are therefore neither true nor false. 108: They axe partly expressions of feeling, partly commands. 109: Distinction between expressions and assertions of feeling, no: Objection that this view makes 1 impossible to dispute about questions of value, no: Actually, we never do dispute about ques.

Paperback. Zustand: Gut. 160 p. Lediglich der Einband ist leicht berieben, sonst ein gutes und sauberes Exemplar ohne Anstreichungen / Only the cover is slightly rubbed, otherwise a good and clean copy without annotations. - CONTENTS Introduction Preface Ch. I. The Elimination of Metaphysics p, 33' What is the purpose and method of philosophy? Rejection of the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a transcendent reality. 34: Kant also rejected metaphysics in this sense, but whereas he accused metaphysicians of ignoring the limits of the human understanding we accuse them of disobeying the rules which govern the significant use of language. 33: Adoption of verifiability as a criterion for testing the significance of putative statements of fact. 36: Distinction between conclusive and partial verification. No propositions can be conclusively verified. 38: Or conclusively confuted. 38: For a statement of fact to be genuine some possible observations must be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood. 39: Examples of the kinds of assertions, familiar to philosophers, which are ruled out by our criterion. 41: Metaphysical sentences defined as sentences which express neither tautologies nor empirical hypotheses. 42: Linguistic confusions the prime source of metaphysics. 44: Metaphysics and Poetry. Ch. II. The Function of Philosophy p. 46: Philosophy is not a search for first principles. 46: Barrenness of Descartes' procedure. 48: The function of philosophy is wholly critical. But this does not mean that it can give an a priori justification of our scientific or common-sense assumptions. 49: There is no genuine problem of induction, as ordinarily conceived. 31: Philosophising is an activity of analysis. 31: Most of those who are commonly thought to have been great philosophers were philosophers in our sense, rather than metaphysicians. 32: Locke, Berkeley, Hume as analysts. 53: We adopt Berkeley's phenomenalism without his theism. 34: And take a Humean view of causation. 56: Philosophy in our sense is wholly independent of metaphysics. We are not committed to any doctrine of atomism. 57; The philosopher as an analyst is not concerned with the physical properties of things, but only with the way in which we speak about them. 38: Linguistic propositions disguised in factual terminology. 39: Philosophy issues in definitions. Ch. III. The Nature of Philosophical Analysis p. 39: Philosophy provides not explicit definitions, such as are given in dictionaries, but definitions in use. Explanation of this distinction. 60: Russell's "theory of descriptions" as an example of philosophical analysis. 62: Definition of an ambiguous symbol. 63: Definition of a logical construction. 64: Material things are logical constructions out of sense-contents. 64: By defining the notion of a material thing in terms of sense-contents we solve the so-called problem of perception. 63: A solution of this problem outlined as a further example of philosophical analysis. 68: Utility of such analyses. 68: Danger of saying that philosophy is concerned with meaning. 70; The propositions of philosophy are not empirical propositions concerning the way in which people actually use words. They are concerned with the logical consequences of linguistic conventions. 71: Rejection of the view that "every language has a structure concerning which in the language nothing can be said." Ch. IV. The A Priori p. 71: As empiricists, we must deny that any general proposition concerning a matter of fact can be known certainly to be valid. 72: How then are we to deal with the propositions of formal logic and mathematics? 74: Rejection of Mill's view that these propositions are inductive generalisations. 77: They are necessarily true because they are analytic. 77: Kant's definitions of analytic and synthetic judgements. 78: Emendation of Kant's definitions. 79: Analytic propositions are tautological; they say nothing concerning any matter of fact. 80: But they give us new knowledge, inasmuch as they bring to light the implications of our linguistic usages. 81: Logic does not describe "the laws of thought." 82: Nor geometry the properties of physical space. 84: Our account of a priori truths undermines Kant's transcendental system. 83: How, if they are tautological, can there be in mathematics and logic the possibility of invention and discovery? Ch. V. Truth and Probability p. 87: What is truth? 88: Definition of a proposition. 88: The words "true" and "false" function in the sentence simply as assertion and negation signs. 90: The "problem of truth" reduced to the question, How are propositions validated? 90: The criterion of the validity of empirical propositions is not purely formal. 91: No empirical propositions are certain, not even those which refer to immediate experience. 94: Observation confirms or discredits not just a single hypothesis but a system of hypotheses. 93: The "facts of experience" can never compel us to abandon a hypothesis. 96: Danger of mistaking synthetic for analytic propositions. 97: Hypotheses as rules which govern our expectation of future experience. 100: Definition of rationality. 101: Definition of probability in terms of rationality. 101: Propositions referring to the past. Ch. VI. Critique of Ethics and Theology p. 102: How does an empiricist deal with assertions of value? 103: Distinction between various types of ethical enquiry. 104: Utilitarian and subjectivist theories of ethics consistent with empiricism. 103: But unacceptable on other grounds. 105: Distinction between normative and descriptive ethical symbols. 106: Rejection of intuitionism. 107: Assertions of value are not scientific but "emotive." 107: They are therefore neither true nor false. 108: They axe partly expressions of feeling, partly commands. 109: Distinction between expressions and assertions of feeling, no: Objection that this view makes 1 impossible to dispute about questions of value, no: Actually, we never do dispute about questi.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: Fair. 1956. Twelfth Impression 2nd Edition. 160 pages. Blue cloth. Pages are moderately tanned and foxed throughout. Heavy annotations and marginalia to pages throughout. Pen and pencil inscription to front free endpaper. Binding remains firm. Boards have mild edge-wear with slight rubbing to surfaces. Heavy sunning to spine and edges.

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Zustand: Good. First Edition. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. reprint edition. 160 pages. 8.00x5.50x0.50 inches. In Stock.