ISBN: 9789400981553 - politicians, legislation, and the economy: an inquiry into the interest-group theory of government (rochester studies in managerial economics and policy, 3, band 3) (2 Ergebnisse)

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - 1 Analyzing Government.- Two Approaches to Analyzing Government.- The Interest-Group Theory of Government.- Plan of the Study.- Notes.- 2 Questions to be Answered.- Wealth Transfers and Organization Costs.- The 'Market' for Wealth Transfers.- What This Analysis Is Not About.- What This Analysis Is About.- Summary.- Appendix: Heterogeneity Begets Wealth Redistribution.- Notes.- 3 The Demand and Supply of Wealth Transfers.- Maximizing the Returns from Legislation in a Bicameral.- Vote Market.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Summary.- Notes.- 4 Legislatures as Wage Cartels.- Theory and Preliminary Implications.- A Test of Relative Wage Implications.- Wage Pay and Malfeasance.- Summary.- Notes.- 5 The Outside Earnings of Politicians.- The Market for Legislators.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Low Wage Pay as an Entry Barrier in Politics.- Summary.- Notes.- 6 The Supply of Majority Leadership.- Competition for Majority Leadership.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Summary.- Notes.- 7 The Determinants of Executive Branch Compensation.- Gubernatorial Compensation.- The Question of Malfeasance.- Summary.- Notes.- 8 Summary, Conclusions, and Future Directions.- Notes.- Name Index. …

Zustand: Hervorragend. Zustand: Hervorragend | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | 1 Analyzing Government.- Two Approaches to Analyzing Government.- The Interest-Group Theory of Government.- Plan of the Study.- Notes.- 2 Questions to be Answered.- Wealth Transfers and Organization Costs.- The "Market" for Wealth Transfers.- What This Analysis Is Not About.- What This Analysis Is About.- Summary.- Appendix: Heterogeneity Begets Wealth Redistribution.- Notes.- 3 The Demand and Supply of Wealth Transfers.- Maximizing the Returns from Legislation in a Bicameral.- Vote Market.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Summary.- Notes.- 4 Legislatures as Wage Cartels.- Theory and Preliminary Implications.- A Test of Relative Wage Implications.- Wage Pay and Malfeasance.- Summary.- Notes.- 5 The Outside Earnings of Politicians.- The Market for Legislators.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Low Wage Pay as an Entry Barrier in Politics.- Summary.- Notes.- 6 The Supply of Majority Leadership.- Competition for Majority Leadership.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Summary.- Notes.- 7 The Determinants of Executive Branch Compensation.- Gubernatorial Compensation.- The Question of Malfeasance.- Summary.- Notes.- 8 Summary, Conclusions, and Future Directions.- Notes.- Name Index.…