9789400970793 - god, free will, and morality: prolegomena to a theory of practical reasoning (philosophical studies series, band 27) von richman, r. (3 Ergebnisse)
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Springer, 2011
- Softcover
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Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 2013
- Softcover
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Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 212 pages. 9.25x6.10x0.48 inches. In Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Springer Netherlands, Springer Netherlands, 2011
- Softcover
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Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - 'He [Francis Bacon] writes of science like a Lord Chan cellor' - William Harvey 'Don't say: 'There must be something common . . . ' - but look and see' Ludwig Wittgenstein In the history of western moral philosophy since Plato, there has been a perva…sive tendency for the moral theorist to wri~e, in effect, like a scientist, Le. to seek completely general prin ciples of right conduct. Of late, moreover, there has been an attempt to set forth a theory underlying the general principles, not of right conduct, admittedly, but of justice. To be sure, we are sometimes warned that the principles (which must exist ) may be too complex to be formulated. Also they may not exist prior to action - nonetheless, we are told, they serve as guides to conduct! One inight argue that Baconian inductivism provides one basis for skepticism with respect to a number of familiar epistemological problems. Thus, the skeptic argues, a certain conclusion - say, the existence of another's pain - is not justified on the basis of (behavioral) evidence either deductively or inductively, and hence it is not justified at all. Similarly, I should claim, by establishing an unattainable standard, the search for exceptionless principles may become a source of moral skepticism. After all, when con fronted with a supposed principle designed to justify a particular ix x PREFACE action, one can generally imagine a counter-example to the prin ciple without excessive difficulty.
