9783540066248 - General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 91, Band 91) von Reinhard Selten, Thomas Marschak (6 Ergebnisse)

Broschiert. Zustand: Gut. 246 Seiten Das hier angebotene Buch stammt aus einer teilaufgelösten Bibliothek und kann die entsprechenden Kennzeichnungen aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.); der Buchzustand ist ansonsten ordentlich und dem Alter entsprechend gut. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 435.

Zustand: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. In good all round condition. No dust jacket. Re-bound by library. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,600grams, ISBN:3540066241.

Paperback. Zustand: Good. Series: Mathematical Economics 247p grey paperback lecture notes, from a Cambridge college library with stickers, no marking internally, very good Language: English.

Zustand: New. In.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 260 pages. 9.61x6.69x0.59 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Motivation. That elegant fiction the competitive equilibrium seems still to dominate the frontiers of theoretical microeconomics. We may think of it in a general way as a state of affairs wherein economic agents, responding 'rationally' to annoWlced prices, make choices which are consistent and feasible. The prices may also be described as 'taken': for one reason or another the agents who respond to them consider them as given. The existence of such a state, its optimality, its robustness against free bargaining among agents when there are many of them, its Wliqueness, its stability when price displacements evoke specified adjustments--all these issues have been studied, and continue to be studied in a variety of settings. Slowly the equilibrium investigated begins to incorporate public goods, externalities of certain kinds, differences in agents' information, and infinitely many time periods. The appeal of such results need not be belabored: the equilibrium studied may sustain an optimal resource allocation, and when it does it sus tains it in a manner that appears to be informationally efficient and to accord well with individual incentives. Therefore it is important to extend the circumstances under which an equilibrium exists, under which it sustains opti mality, and under which it survives displacements as well as free bargaining among agents.