Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: New York/ NY, Springer US., 2003
ISBN 10: 1402075367 ISBN 13: 9781402075360
Anbieter: Universitätsbuchhandlung Herta Hold GmbH, Berlin, Deutschland
2004. 16 x 24 cm. V, 278 S. V, 278 p. Hardcover. Versand aus Deutschland / We dispatch from Germany via Air Mail. Einband bestoßen, daher Mängelexemplar gestempelt, sonst sehr guter Zustand. Imperfect copy due to slightly bumped cover, apart from this in very good condition. Stamped. Sprache: Englisch.
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 115,59
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003
ISBN 10: 1402075367 ISBN 13: 9781402075360
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. Presents a selection of papers on Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities. This publication is intent on building bridges between economics and the other social sciences. It focuses on the interaction between monetary policy and wage bargaining institutions in European Monetary Union (EMU). Editor(s): Franzese, Robert J., Jr.; Schurz, Martin; Mooslechner, Peter. Num Pages: 278 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KCF. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 234 x 156 x 17. Weight in Grams: 586. . 2003. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This important collection presents an authoritative selection of papers on 'Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities' This publication is intent on building bridges between economics and the other social sciences. The focus is on the interaction between monetary policy and wage bargaining institutions in European Monetary Union (EMU). Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities is written by acknowledged experts in their field. The outcome is a broad analysis of the interactions of labour market actors and central banks. The volume addresses the recent changes in EMU. An important theoretical, empirical, and policy-relevant conclusion that emerges from Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities is that even perfectly credible monetary conservatism has long-term real effects, even in equilibrium models with fully rational expectations.