9781249440352 - what is the role of survivability operations in the current force? von smallfield, jason l. (3 Ergebnisse)
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Zustand: New. KlappentextrnrnThe contemporary operational environment (COE) has necessitated many changes in the way that American forces prepare for and conduct war. The problem, however, is that most of these changes do not adequately address the role that .
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Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - The contemporary operational environment (COE) has necessitated many changes in the way that American forces prepare for and conduct war. The problem, however, is that most of these changes do not adequately address the role that survivability operations should play across the full spectrum o…f conflict at the tactical level of warfare. Survivability Operations (SO) are all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while simultaneously deceiving the enemy to include cover, concealment, camouflage, and deception (C3D). Thus, the central research question is: what is the role of survivability operations in the current force The Training and Doctrine Command's DOTMLP framework was used to answer this question. Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, and personnel all require small or large modifications in order to emphasize or increase the role that SO play across the full spectrum of conflict at the tactical level. Doctrine is incomplete and fragmented. Organizations for SO are either non-existent or too austere. Training does not adequately address or prepare for SO. Materiel is varied but more variety and quantities are required. Leadership and education in formal schooling teaches SO as an embedded subject rather than a stand alone one. Finally, the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) system does a poor job of delineating responsibility for SO.
