Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 1107514517 ISBN 13: 9781107514515
Anbieter: Books From California, Simi Valley, CA, USA
paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Cover and edges may have some wear.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 1107514517 ISBN 13: 9781107514515
Anbieter: Romtrade Corp., STERLING HEIGHTS, MI, USA
Zustand: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 1107514517 ISBN 13: 9781107514515
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 38,48
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
EUR 54,76
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbPaperback. Zustand: Brand New. 333 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 1107514517 ISBN 13: 9781107514515
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? This book argues that they are useful for deterrence but not for offensive purposes. Num Pages: 320 pages, 7 b/w illus. 20 tables. BIC Classification: JPSD; JWMN. Category: (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 155 x 227 x 20. Weight in Grams: 494. . 2017. Reprint. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 1107514517 ISBN 13: 9781107514515
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.