Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 1107181690 ISBN 13: 9781107181694
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 129,86
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 1107181690 ISBN 13: 9781107181694
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
EUR 183,95
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. This book employs a diverse set of research methods to confront widely accepted principles of regulatory agency design. Num Pages: 280 pages. BIC Classification: JPP; KC. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152. . . 2017. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 183,41
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbHardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 320 pages. 9.25x6.50x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 1107181690 ISBN 13: 9781107181694
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - In the search for explanations for three of the most pressing crises of the early twenty-first century (the housing meltdown and financial crisis, the Gulf oil spill, and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima), commentators pointed to the structure of the regulatory agencies charged with overseeing the associated industries, noting that the need to balance competing regulatory and non-regulatory missions undermined each agency's ability to be an effective regulator. Christopher Carrigan challenges this critique by employing a diverse set of research methods, including a statistical analysis, an in-depth case study of US regulatory oversight of offshore oil and gas development leading up to the Gulf oil spill, and a formal theoretical discussion, to systematically evaluate the benefits and concerns associated with either combining or separating regulatory and non-regulatory missions. His analysis demonstrates for policymakers and scholars why assigning competing non-regulatory missions to regulatory agencies can still be better than separating them in some cases.