Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2015
ISBN 10: 1107121817 ISBN 13: 9781107121812
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 101,99
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2015
ISBN 10: 1107121817 ISBN 13: 9781107121812
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
EUR 143,80
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. Power Plays argues that international institutions prevent extortion in some areas, but cause states to shift coercive behavior into less effective policy domains. Num Pages: 206 pages, 5 b/w illus. 8 tables. BIC Classification: JPS. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 237 x 159 x 18. Weight in Grams: 430. . 2015. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 173,43
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbHardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 1st edition. 208 pages. 9.25x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2015
ISBN 10: 1107121817 ISBN 13: 9781107121812
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Coercive diplomacy - the use of threats and assurances to alter another state's behavior - isindispensable to internationalrelations. Most scholarship has focused on whether and when states are able to use coercive methods to achieve their desired results. However, employing game-theoretic tools, statistical modeling, and detailed case study analysis, Power Plays builds and tests a theory that explains how states develop strategies of coercive diplomacy, how their targets shield themselves from these efforts, and the implications for interstate relations. Focusing on the World Trade Organization, Power Plays argues that coercive diplomacy often precludes cooperation due to fears of exploitation, but that international institutions can solve these problems by convincing states to eschew certain tools for coercive purposes.