Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 1107013755 ISBN 13: 9781107013759
Anbieter: Joseph Burridge Books, Dagenham, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 19,06
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In den WarenkorbHardcover. Zustand: Good. x, 293 pages ; 24 cm. occasional notes in pen.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 1107013755 ISBN 13: 9781107013759
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 120,33
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In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 1107013755 ISBN 13: 9781107013759
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
EUR 170,30
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. Chong argues that when foreign actors face high opportunity costs of intervention in a weak state, their behavior may foster sovereignty. Num Pages: 304 pages, 5 b/w illus. 7 maps 11 tables. BIC Classification: 1FMN; 1FMT; 1FPC; 3JJ; JPHC; JPS. Category: (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 236 x 164 x 25. Weight in Grams: 582. . 2012. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 188,47
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In den WarenkorbHardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 304 pages. 9.50x6.50x1.00 inches. In Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 1107013755 ISBN 13: 9781107013759
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book explores ways foreign intervention and external rivalries can affect the institutionalization of governance in weak states. When sufficiently competitive, foreign rivalries in a weak state can actually foster the political centralization, territoriality and autonomy associated with state sovereignty. This counterintuitive finding comes from studying the collective effects of foreign contestation over a weak state as informed by changes in the expected opportunity cost of intervention for outside actors. When interveners associate high opportunity costs with intervention, they bolster sovereign statehood as a next best alternative to their worst fear - domination of that polity by adversaries. Sovereign statehood develops if foreign actors concurrently and consistently behave this way toward a weak state. This book evaluates that argument against three 'least likely' cases - China, Indonesia and Thailand between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries.