Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 1107000149 ISBN 13: 9781107000148
Anbieter: Labyrinth Books, Princeton, NJ, USA
Zustand: Very Good.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 1107000149 ISBN 13: 9781107000148
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
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In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 1107000149 ISBN 13: 9781107000148
Anbieter: Buchmarie, Darmstadt, Deutschland
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Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 1107000149 ISBN 13: 9781107000148
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EUR 107,21
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In den WarenkorbZustand: New. This book argues that many mental states, including such conscious states as perceptual experiences and bodily sensations, are identical with brain states. Editor(s): Gozzano, Simone; Hill, Christopher S. Num Pages: 304 pages, Illustrations. BIC Classification: HPM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 229 x 162 x 20. Weight in Grams: 612. . 2012. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
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In den WarenkorbHardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 1st edition. 280 pages. 9.25x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Anbieter: Asano Bookshop, Nagoya, AICHI, Japan
Zustand: Brand New.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2012
ISBN 10: 1107000149 ISBN 13: 9781107000148
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This volume brings together leading philosophers of mind, whose essays challenge in new ways the standard objections to type identity theory, such as the multiple realizability objection and the modal argument. Other essays show how cognitive science and neuroscience are lending new support to type identity theory and still others provide, extend and improve traditional arguments concerning the theory's explanatory power.