9780815709817 - strategic command and control: redefining the nuclear threat von blair, bruce (9 Ergebnisse)
- Softcover
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Zustand: Very Good. Item in very good condition! Textbooks may not include supplemental items i.e. CDs, access codes etc.
- Softcover
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Paperback. Zustand: Fair. No Jacket. Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.
- Softcover
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Paperback. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.
- Softcover
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Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.
- Softcover
- Erstausgabe
Anbieter: Ground Zero Books, Ltd., Silver Spring, MD, USAGround Zero Books, Ltd.
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Trade paperback. Zustand: Very good. xiv, 341, [13] pages. Illustrations, black & white. Abbreviations and Acronyms. Map. Footnotes. Index. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Bruce G. Blair (born 1947) is a nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University's Wood…row Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He focuses on technical and policy steps on the path toward the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, specifically on deep bilateral nuclear arms reductions, multilateral arms negotiations and de-alerting of nuclear arsenals. In 2011, he was appointed to the U.S. Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board, a group of experts that provides the Department of State with independent insight and advice on all aspects of international security, disarmament and arms control. In 1999, he was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship Prize for his research and leadership on de-alerting nuclear forces. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence. First edition. First paperback edition. First printing [stated].
- Softcover
- Erstausgabe
Anbieter: Palimpsest Scholarly Books & Services, Brooktondale, NY, USAPalimpsest Scholarly Books & Services
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Soft cover. Zustand: Fine. 1st Edition. Second printing. Softcover volume, measuring approximately 6.25" x 9.25", displays very light shelfwear. Binding is firm. Interior is clean and bright. Illustrated with tables, graphs and maps. xiv/341 pages. "During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nu…clear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U. S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communication not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike.".
- Softcover
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Zustand: New. In.
- Softcover
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes KönigreichRevaluation Books
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Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 356 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock.
- Softcover
Anbieter: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Vereinigtes KönigreichMajestic Books
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Zustand: New. pp. 341.
