Zustand: Good. Item in good condition. Textbooks may not include supplemental items i.e. CDs, access codes etc.
Paperback. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.
Anbieter: Books From California, Simi Valley, CA, USA
paperback. Zustand: Fine.
Anbieter: WorldofBooks, Goring-By-Sea, WS, Vereinigtes Königreich
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In den WarenkorbPaperback. Zustand: Very Good. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: MB - Cornell University Press, 2003
ISBN 10: 0801488478 ISBN 13: 9780801488474
Anbieter: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 27,57
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In den WarenkorbPAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 29,24
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In den WarenkorbPaperback. Zustand: Brand New. 1st edition. 304 pages. 9.25x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Zustand: New. Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Num Pages: 304 pages, 3. BIC Classification: 1KBB; HBJK; HBLW; JWM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 156 x 234 x 16. Weight in Grams: 402. . 2003. 1st Edition. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Anbieter: Studibuch, Stuttgart, Deutschland
paperback. Zustand: Sehr gut. 304 Seiten; 9780801488474.2 Gewicht in Gramm: 1.
EUR 25,19
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In den WarenkorbZustand: New. Johnson examines the U.S. Army s innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, offering valuable insights for future military innovation.Über den AutorDavid E. JohnsonInhaltsverzeichnis.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cornell University Press Apr 2003, 2003
ISBN 10: 0801488478 ISBN 13: 9780801488474
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine.