Isbn: 9780801478062 - why intelligence fails: lessons from the iranian revolution and the iraq war (cornell studies in security affairs) (13 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: acceptable. This copy has clearly been enjoyedâ"expect noticeable shelf wear and some minor creases to the cover. Binding is strong, and all pages are legible. May contain previous library markings or stamps.

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good.

Paperback. Zustand: Fine.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. bc edition. 248 pages. 9.00x6.10x0.80 inches. In Stock.

Zustand: New. pp. 248.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. bc edition. 248 pages. 9.00x6.10x0.80 inches. In Stock.

Zustand: New. Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Num Pages: 248 pages. BIC Classification: JPSH. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 235 x 153 x 9. Weight in Grams: 346. . 2011. 1st Edition. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Zustand: New. In English.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. InWhy Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations-analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind-were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.…

Zustand: NEW.

Zustand: New. Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the 2002 claim that Iraq had active WMD programs.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Why Intelligence Fails | Robert Jervis | Taschenbuch | Einband - flex.(Paperback) | Englisch | 2011 | Cornell University Press | EAN 9780801478062 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.