Zustand: Very Good. Item in very good condition! Textbooks may not include supplemental items i.e. CDs, access codes etc.
Anbieter: ThriftBooks-Atlanta, AUSTELL, GA, USA
Hardcover. Zustand: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.
Anbieter: Anybook.com, Lincoln, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 13,69
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. In good all round condition. Dust jacket in good condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,750grams, ISBN:9780801442216.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: MB - Cornell University Press, 2004
ISBN 10: 0801442214 ISBN 13: 9780801442216
Anbieter: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 72,30
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbHRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Num Pages: 336 pages, 9. BIC Classification: JPS. Category: (G) General (US: Trade); (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 235 x 156 x 19. Weight in Grams: 635. . 2004. Hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Gebunden. Zustand: New. Great powers often initiate risky military and diplomatic inventions in far-off, peripheral regions that pose no direct threat to them, risking direct confrontation with rivals in strategically inconsequential places. Why do powerful countries behave.
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 113,08
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbHardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 1st edition. 336 pages. 9.00x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cornell University Press Apr 2004, 2004
ISBN 10: 0801442214 ISBN 13: 9780801442216
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Great powers often initiate risky military and diplomatic inventions in far-off, peripheral regions that pose no direct threat to them, risking direct confrontation with rivals in strategically inconsequential places. Why do powerful countries behave in a way that leads to entrapment in prolonged, expensive, and self-defeating conflicts Jeffrey W. Taliaferro suggests that such interventions are driven by the refusal of senior officials to accept losses in their state's relative power, international status, or prestige. Instead of cutting their losses, leaders often continue to invest blood and money in failed excursions into the periphery. Their policies may seem to be driven by rational concerns about power and security, but Taliaferro deems them to be at odds with the master explanation of political realism. Taliaferro constructs a 'balance-of-risk' theory of foreign policy that draws on defensive realism (in international relations) and prospects theory (in psychology). He illustrates the power of this new theory in several case narratives: Germany's initiation and escalation of the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan crises, the United States's involvement in the Korean War in 1950-52, and Japan's entanglement in the second Sino--Japanese war in 1937-40 and its decisions for war with the U.S. in 1940-41.