Isbn: 9780792362388 - believing and accepting (philosophical studies series, 83, band 83) (4 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: Very Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with possible writing/highlighting. Binding strong with minor wear. Dust jackets/supplements may not be included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Zustand: New. In English.

Zustand: New. The notion of belief figures prominently in contemporary philosophy of language and mind and in cognitive science. This work features essays that address a range of issues concerning the complexity of our belief attitudes, their contents, and the influence of motivational factors on beliefs. Editor(s): Engel, Pascal. Series: Philosophical Studies Series. Num Pages: 307 pages, biography. BIC Classification: HPK. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 19. Weight in Grams: 1360. . 2000. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.…

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - (1) Beliefs are involuntary, and not nonnally subject to direct voluntary control. For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such things. (2) Beliefs are nonnally shaped by evidence for what is believed, unless they are, in some sense, irrational. In general a belief is rational if it is proportioned to the degree of evidence that one has for its truth. In this sense, one often says that 'beliefs aim at truth' . This is why it is, on the face of it, irrational to believe against the evidence that one has. A subject whose beliefs are not shaped by a concern for their truth, but by what she wants to be the case, is more or less a wishful thinker or a self-deceiver. (3) Beliefs are context independent, in the sense that at one time a subject believes something or does not believe it; she does not believe it relative to one context and not relative to another. For instance if I believe that Paris is a polluted city, I cannot believe that on Monday and not on Tuesday; that would be a change of belief, or a change of mind, but not a case of believing one thing in one context and another thing in another context. If I believe something, the belief is more or 4 less pennanent across various contexts.…