9780792347071 - Contingent Future Persons: On the Ethics of Deciding Who Will Live, or Not, in the Future (Theology and Medicine, 9, Band 9) (5 Ergebnisse)

Hardcover. Zustand: Very Good. Hardcover. No DJ. This is a former Theological library copy but still in very good condition. All usual library markings . Pages are clean and unmarked. Covers show very minor shelf wear. Binding is tight, hinges strong. APPEARS TO HAVE HAD MINIMAL USE AS LIBRARY COPY.; 100% Satisfaction Guaranteed! Ships same or next business day!

Zustand: Good. Your purchase helps support Sri Lankan Children's Charity 'The Rainbow Centre'. Ex-library, so some stamps and wear, but in good overall condition. Our donations to The Rainbow Centre have helped provide an education and a safe haven to hundreds of children who live in appalling conditions.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. Concerned with how we ought to evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend. This volume explores the theological implications of the problem and advances the investigation of it both in philosophical and in theological terms. Editor(s): Fotion, N.; Heller, Jan C. Series: Theology and Medicine. Num Pages: 216 pages, biography. BIC Classification: HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 244 x 170 x 14. Weight in Grams: 498. . 1997. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - How ought we evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend In the briefest of terms, this question poses what is addressed here as the problem of contingent future persons, and as such it poses relatively novel challenges for philosophical and theological ethicists. For though it may be counter-intuitive, it seems that those contingent future persons who are actually brought into existence by such actions cannot benefit from or be harmed by these actions in any conventional sense of the terms. This intriguing problem was defined almost three decades ago by Jan Narveson [2], and to date its implications have been explored most exhaustively by Derek Parfit [3] and David Heyd [1]. Nevertheless, as yet there is simply no consensus on how we ought to evaluate such actions or, indeed, on whether we can. Still, the pursuit of a solution to the problem has been interestingly employed by moral philosophers to press the limits of ethics and to urge a reconsideration of the nature and source of value at its most fundamental level. It is thus proving to be a very fruitful investigation, with far-reaching theoretical and practical implications.