Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2008
ISBN 10: 0521881021 ISBN 13: 9780521881029
Anbieter: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 46,01
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. pp. 416.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2008
ISBN 10: 0521881021 ISBN 13: 9780521881029
Anbieter: Romtrade Corp., STERLING HEIGHTS, MI, USA
Zustand: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2008
ISBN 10: 0521881021 ISBN 13: 9780521881029
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 54,30
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2008
ISBN 10: 0521881021 ISBN 13: 9780521881029
Anbieter: Romtrade Corp., STERLING HEIGHTS, MI, USA
Zustand: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2008
ISBN 10: 0521881021 ISBN 13: 9780521881029
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. The book explains how different political and economic circumstances account for the variation in the economic vote. Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Num Pages: 416 pages, 25 tables. BIC Classification: JP. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 27. Weight in Grams: 67. . 2008. 1st Edition. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 106,14
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbHardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 1st edition. 399 pages. 9.00x6.00x1.00 inches. In Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2008
ISBN 10: 0521881021 ISBN 13: 9780521881029
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic voting: Rational voters condition the economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes, because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived, linking variation in economic and political institutions to variability in economic voting. The authors demonstrate that there is economic voting, and that it varies significantly across political contexts. The data consist of 165 election studies conducted in 19 different countries over a 20-year time period.