9780521857468 - Fiscal Governance in Europe (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) von Hallerberg, Mark; Strauch, Rolf Rainer; Hagen, Jurgen Von (6 Ergebnisse)

Hardcover. Zustand: Like New. First Edition. Firm, square and tight with sharp corners and sturdy hinges, just showing a few minor rubs and some mild cosmetic wear. Hence a non-text page is stamped 'damaged'. Despite such this book is in nearly new condition. Thus the contents are crisp, fresh and clean. Offered for sale at a very sensible price.

Hardcover. 1. publ. 230 S. Ehem. Bibliotheksexemplar mit Signatur und Stempel. GUTER Zustand, ein paar Gebrauchsspuren. Ex-library with stamp and library-signature. GOOD condition, some traces of use. 9780521857468 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 550.

Hardcover. Zustand: Très bon. Ancien livre de bibliothèque avec équipements. Couverture différente. Edition 2009. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Very good. Former library book. Different cover. Edition 2009. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. Based on data from European Union countries, this book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Num Pages: 246 pages, 5 b/w illus. 45 tables. BIC Classification: 1D; JPB. Category: (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 236 x 159 x 28. Weight in Grams: 536. . 2009. 1st Edition. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.