Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2006
ISBN 10: 0521842697 ISBN 13: 9780521842693
Anbieter: books4less (Versandantiquariat Petra Gros GmbH & Co. KG), Welling, Deutschland
Broschiert. Zustand: Gut. 313 Seiten Der Erhaltungszustand des hier angebotenen Werks ist trotz seiner Bibliotheksnutzung sehr sauber und kann entsprechende Merkmale aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.). In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 465.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521842697 ISBN 13: 9780521842693
Anbieter: Kloof Booksellers & Scientia Verlag, Amsterdam, Niederlande
Zustand: very good. Cambridge & New York : Cambridge University Press, c2006. Hardcover. Dustjacket. xvi, 313, [4] p. : ill. ; 24 cm. Condition : very good copy. ISBN 9780521842693. Keywords : RECHT,
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521842697 ISBN 13: 9780521842693
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
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In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521842697 ISBN 13: 9780521842693
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. This book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline. Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Num Pages: 334 pages, 22 tables. BIC Classification: JPB; KFFD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 22. Weight in Grams: 660. . 2006. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521842697 ISBN 13: 9780521842693
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.