9780521817448 - deliberate discretion?: the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy (cambridge studies in comparative politics) von huber, john d.; shipan, charles r. (3 Ergebnisse)

- Hardcover
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes KönigreichRia Christie Collections
Verkäufer/-in kontaktierenVerkäufer/-in mit 5 SternenZustand: Neu
EUR 106,66
EUR 13,99 VersandVersand von Vereinigtes Königreich nach USAAnzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Zustand: New. In.

- Hardcover
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USAKennys Bookstore
Verkäufer/-in kontaktierenVerkäufer/-in mit 5 SternenZustand: Neu
EUR 195,46
EUR 9,18 VersandVersand innerhalb von USAAnzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Zustand: New. This book explains the different approaches legislators use when they write laws. Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Num Pages: 304 pages, 18 b/w illus. 18 tables. BIC Classification: 1KB; JPQ; KCP; YQN. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 228 x…152 x 21. Weight in Grams: 553. . 2002. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

- Hardcover
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, DeutschlandAHA-BUCH GmbH
Verkäufer/-in kontaktierenVerkäufer/-in mit 5 SternenZustand: Neu
EUR 136,15
EUR 63,24 VersandVersand von Deutschland nach USAAnzahl: 1 verfügbar
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The laws that legislatures adopt provide the most important and definitive opportunity elected politicians have to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy varies considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt… detailed and specific laws in efforts to micromanage policy-making processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial autonomy to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter The authors address this issue by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the American states, they argue that particular institutional forms have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policy making process.