Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2000
ISBN 10: 0521789907 ISBN 13: 9780521789905
Sprache: Englisch
Anbieter: WorldofBooks, Goring-By-Sea, WS, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 1,66
Anzahl: 6 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbPaperback. Zustand: Very Good. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2000
ISBN 10: 0521789907 ISBN 13: 9780521789905
Sprache: Englisch
Anbieter: ThriftBooks-Atlanta, AUSTELL, GA, USA
Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. No Jacket. Former library book; May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2000
ISBN 10: 0521789907 ISBN 13: 9780521789905
Sprache: Englisch
Anbieter: WorldofBooks, Goring-By-Sea, WS, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 12,62
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbPaperback. Zustand: Fine.
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2000
ISBN 10: 0521789907 ISBN 13: 9780521789905
Sprache: Englisch
Anbieter: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 30,21
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. pp. 136.
EUR 58,72
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbPaperback. Zustand: Brand New. 1st edition. 136 pages. 9.00x5.75x0.50 inches. In Stock.
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2000
ISBN 10: 0521789907 ISBN 13: 9780521789905
Sprache: Englisch
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Arising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ariel Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas for social scientists that should help to encourage a fundamental rethinking of many of the underlying assumptions in economic theory and game theory. As a postscript two economists, Tilman Borgers (University College London) and Bart Lipman (University of Wisconsin, Madison), and a logician, Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation and Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information) offer comments.