Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, West Nyack, New York, U.S.A., 2009
ISBN 10: 0521767938 ISBN 13: 9780521767934
Anbieter: JuddSt.Pancras, London, Vereinigtes Königreich
Verbandsmitglied: PBFA
EUR 16,69
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In den WarenkorbHardcover. Zustand: Very Good. Books sent promptly by first class post.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2009
ISBN 10: 0521767938 ISBN 13: 9780521767934
Anbieter: Romtrade Corp., STERLING HEIGHTS, MI, USA
Zustand: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2009
ISBN 10: 0521767938 ISBN 13: 9780521767934
Anbieter: Kloof Booksellers & Scientia Verlag, Amsterdam, Niederlande
Zustand: very good. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009. Hardcover. xviii,326 pp. - Why do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises, while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed? In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusing on the economic interests of authoritarian regimes' supporters, Pepinsky shows that differences in cross-border asset specificity produce dramatically different outcomes in regimes facing financial crises. When asset specificity divides supporters, as in Indonesia, they desire mutually incompatible adjustment policies, yielding incoherent adjustment policy followed by regime collapse. When coalitions are not divided by asset specificity, as in Malaysia, regimes adopt radical adjustment measures that enable them to survive financial crises. Combining rich qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia with cross-national time-series data and comparative case studies of Latin American autocracies, Pepinsky reveals the power of coalitions and capital mobility to explain how financial crises produce regime change. Condition : very good copy. ISBN 9780521767934. Keywords : INDONESIA,
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2009
ISBN 10: 0521767938 ISBN 13: 9780521767934
Anbieter: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 46,31
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In den WarenkorbZustand: New. pp. 344.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2009
ISBN 10: 0521767938 ISBN 13: 9780521767934
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 59,36
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In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2009
ISBN 10: 0521767938 ISBN 13: 9780521767934
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. Thomas B. Pepinsky examines how coalitions and capital mobility in Indonesia and Malaysia shape the links between financial crises and regime change. Num Pages: 344 pages, 17 b/w illus. 31 tables. BIC Classification: 1FMM; 1FMN; JPH; KCP; KCX. Category: (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 26. . . 2009. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2009
ISBN 10: 0521767938 ISBN 13: 9780521767934
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Why do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises, while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusing on the economic interests of authoritarian regimes' supporters, Pepinsky shows that differences in cross-border asset specificity produce dramatically different outcomes in regimes facing financial crises. When asset specificity divides supporters, as in Indonesia, they desire mutually incompatible adjustment policies, yielding incoherent adjustment policy followed by regime collapse. When coalitions are not divided by asset specificity, as in Malaysia, regimes adopt radical adjustment measures that enable them to survive financial crises. Combining rich qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia with cross-national time-series data and comparative case studies of Latin American autocracies, Pepinsky reveals the power of coalitions and capital mobility to explain how financial crises produce regime change.