ISBN: 9780521625500 - veto bargaining: presidents and the politics of negative power (political economy of institutions and decisions) (8 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: Good. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Zustand: Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Cover and edges may have some wear.

Zustand: Good. Your purchase helps support Sri Lankan Children's Charity 'The Rainbow Centre'. Ex-library, so some stamps and wear, but in good overall condition. Our donations to The Rainbow Centre have helped provide an education and a safe haven to hundreds of children who live in appalling conditions.…

Zustand: New. In English.

Zustand: New. Combining game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party Presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile congress. Series Editor(s): Calvert, Randall; Eggertsson, Thrainn. Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Num Pages: 312 pages, 47 b/w illus. 26 tables. BIC Classification: 1KBB; JPH; JPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 18. Weight in Grams: 430. . 2008. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The late-twentieth century has given rise to the most concentrated period of divided party government in American history. With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining offers a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.…