Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2010
ISBN 10: 0521604044 ISBN 13: 9780521604048
Anbieter: Anybook.com, Lincoln, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 9,54
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: Fair. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. In fair condition, suitable as a study copy. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,500grams, ISBN:9780521604048.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2004
ISBN 10: 0521604044 ISBN 13: 9780521604048
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 44,78
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2004
ISBN 10: 0521604044 ISBN 13: 9780521604048
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. This book examines the decline of central planning in post-Mao China. Series: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences. Num Pages: 272 pages, 3 b/w illus. 17 tables. BIC Classification: 1FPC; KCP; KCS; KN. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 16. Weight in Grams: 376. . 2010. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2004
ISBN 10: 0521604044 ISBN 13: 9780521604048
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Between Politics and Markets examines how the decline of central planning in post-Mao China was related to the rise of two markets - an economic market for the exchange of products and factors, and a political market for the diversion to private interests of state assets and authorities. Lin reveals their concurrent development through an account of how industrial firms competed their way out of the plan through exchange relations with one another and with state agents. He argues that the two markets were mutually accommodating, that the political market grew also from a decay of the state's self-monitoring capacity, and that economic actors' competition for special favors from state agents constituted a major driving force of economic institutional change.