Isbn: 9780521603546 - the politics of property rights: political instability, credible commitments, and economic growth in mexico, 1876-1929 (political economy of institutions and decisions) (3 Ergebnisse)

Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2004
Serie: Buch 26 von 81 - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
- Softcover
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes KönigreichRia Christie Collections
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Zustand: New. In English.

Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2004
Serie: Buch 26 von 81 - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
- Softcover
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USAKennys Bookstore
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Zustand: New. This book explains why political instability is not necessarily correlated with economic stagnation. Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Num Pages: 406 pages, 5 b/w illus. 1 map 64 tables. BIC Classification: 1KLCM; 3JH; 3JJC; 3JJF; 3JJG; JP; KCM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 21. Weight in Grams: 546. . 2004. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2004
Serie: Buch 26 von 81 - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
- Softcover
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, DeutschlandAHA-BUCH GmbH
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Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book addresses a puzzle in political economy: why is it that political instability does not necessarily translate into economic stagnation or collapse In order to address this puzzle, it advances a theory about property rights systems in many less developed countries. In this theory, governments do not have to enforce property rights as a public good. Instead, they may enforce property rights selectively (as a private good), and share the resulting rents with the group of asset holders who are integrated into the government. Focusing on Mexico, this book explains how the property rights system was constructed during the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship (1876-1911) and then explores how this property rights system either survived, or was reconstructed. The result is an analytic economic history of Mexico under both stability and instability, and a generalizable framework about the interaction of political and economic institutions.…