9780521593526 - Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory) von Weirich, Paul (6 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: Very Good. Most items will be dispatched the same or the next working day. A copy that has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.

Zustand: Good. Your purchase helps support Sri Lankan Children's Charity 'The Rainbow Centre'. Ex-library, so some stamps and wear, but in good overall condition. Our donations to The Rainbow Centre have helped provide an education and a safe haven to hundreds of children who live in appalling conditions.

Cloth. Zustand: Very Good. Zustand des Schutzumschlags: Very Good. Type: Book N.B. Small plain label inside front cover. Ink remainder mark to bottom edge of pages.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. This major contribution to game theory offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. Series Editor(s): Skyrms, Brian; Adams, Ernest W.; Binmore, Ken; Butterfield, Jeremy; Diaconis, Persi; Harper, William L.; Harsanyi, John; Jeffrey, Richard C.; Spohn, Wolfgang. Series: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory. Num Pages: 250 pages, 51 b/w illus. BIC Classification: HPL; PBUD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 17. Weight in Grams: 495. . 1998. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.