Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 1997
ISBN 10: 0521574447 ISBN 13: 9780521574440
Paperback. Slight foxing on upper edge of text. Otherwise VG 270 pp.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 1993
ISBN 10: 0521574447 ISBN 13: 9780521574440
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 55,23
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 1997
ISBN 10: 0521574447 ISBN 13: 9780521574440
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 72,73
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbPaperback. Zustand: Brand New. reprint edition. 270 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 1993
ISBN 10: 0521574447 ISBN 13: 9780521574440
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
EUR 104,54
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. Series: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory. Num Pages: 288 pages, Illustrations. BIC Classification: HPK; HPL. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 15. Weight in Grams: 395. . 1997. Revised ed. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 1993
ISBN 10: 0521574447 ISBN 13: 9780521574440
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behaviour. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise. If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of attaining coordination. The solution to coordination and cooperation is for agents to learn about each other. The author concludes that rationality must be supplemented by models of learning and by an evolutionary account of how social order (i.e. spontaneous coordinated behaviour) can persist.