Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 1996
ISBN 10: 0521550130 ISBN 13: 9780521550130
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 59,42
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 1996
ISBN 10: 0521550130 ISBN 13: 9780521550130
Anbieter: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 80,22
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. pp. 312 51 Illus.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 1996
ISBN 10: 0521550130 ISBN 13: 9780521550130
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
EUR 116,44
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. The book assesses the impact of political and social institutions on regulatory structures in the telecommunications industry in five countries. Editor(s): Levy, Brian; Spiller, Pablo T. Series Editor(s): Calvert, Randall; Eggertsson, Thrainn. Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Num Pages: 312 pages, 51 b/w illus. 17 tables. BIC Classification: KCP; KNT. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 21. Weight in Grams: 560. . 1997. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 1996
ISBN 10: 0521550130 ISBN 13: 9780521550130
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The book assesses the impact of core political and social institutions on regulatory structures and performance in the telecommunications industry in Jamaica, the United Kingdom, Chile, Argentina, and the Philippines. These core institutions are shown to influence strongly the credibility and effectiveness of regulation, and thus its ability to encourage private investment and support efficiency. Currently, privatization and regulatory reform are often viewed as the solution to the problem of poor performance by telecommunications and other public utilities. This volume argues that these high expectations may not always be met because of the way a country's political and social institutions - its executive, legislative and judicial systems, its informal norms of public behaviour - interact with regulatory processes and economic conditions. In some environments, regulatory solutions run counter to the prevailing wisdom: achieving credible commitment may require an inflexible regulatory regime, and sometimes public ownership of utilities may be the only feasible alternative.