Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2003
ISBN 10: 0521522218 ISBN 13: 9780521522212
Anbieter: WorldofBooks, Goring-By-Sea, WS, Vereinigtes Königreich
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In den WarenkorbPaperback. Zustand: Very Good. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2003
ISBN 10: 0521522218 ISBN 13: 9780521522212
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 55,25
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2003
ISBN 10: 0521522218 ISBN 13: 9780521522212
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. This book provides case studies of worker-controlled firms and surveys available evidence on their behavior. Num Pages: 342 pages, 1 b/w illus. 6 tables. BIC Classification: KJVW. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 20. Weight in Grams: 452. . 2003. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 80,23
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In den WarenkorbPaperback. Zustand: Brand New. 323 pages. 9.00x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2003
ISBN 10: 0521522218 ISBN 13: 9780521522212
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Most large firms are controlled by shareholders, who choose the board of directors and can replace the firm's management. In rare instances, however, control over the firm rests with the workforce. Many explanations for the rarity of workers' control have been offered, but there have been few attempts to assess these hypotheses in a systematic way. This book draws upon economic theory, statistical evidence, and case studies to frame an explanation. The fundamental idea is that labor is inalienable, while capital can be freely transferred from one person to another. This implies that worker-controlled firms typically face financing problems, encounter collective choice dilemmas, and have difficulty creating markets for control positions within the firm. Together these factors can account for much of what is known about the incidence, behavior, and design of worker-controlled firms. A policy proposal to encourage employee buyouts is developed in the concluding chapter.