Isbn: 9780521432450 - making and breaking governments: cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies (political economy of institutions and decisions) (5 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: Acceptable. Used - Acceptable. Ex-library with wear - may contain significant amounts of highlighting and underlining in pen or pencil. Your purchase helps support Sri Lankan Children's Charity 'The Rainbow Centre'. Our donations to The Rainbow Centre have helped provide an education and a safe haven to hundreds of children who live in appalling conditions.…

Zustand: New. In English.

Zustand: New. Making and Breaking Governments theorizes on how parties create, maintain, or replace new governments. Editor(s): Laver, Michael; Shepsle, Kenneth A. Series Editor(s): Calvert, Randall; Eggertsson, Thrainn. Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Num Pages: 316 pages, 41 b/w illus. 37 tables. BIC Classification: JPHV; JPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 19. Weight in Grams: 539. . 1996. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

Hardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 320 pages. 9.50x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.…